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A Comparative Case Study Assessing Impacts of Non-Financial Risk 
 
By Danielle Comeau 
 
Abstract:  Qualitative review of academic and professional publications was undertaken 
to determine non-financial risk factors affecting mining projects.  The research provides 
guidance for the development of a non-financial risk framework, which serves as a basis 
for analysis.  An evaluation of two mine operations is presented on a comparative list of 
similar and dissimilar approaches to non-financial risk mitigation.  The reasons for 
relative project success and failure are identified. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Professionally published opinions regarding the risks to mining sector success draws 
attention to the rising importance of labour and social economic considerations 
throughout the project lifecycle process.  Ernst & Young (E&Y), a global management 
consulting firm with a special disciplinary focus in energy and resources, issues an annual 
report citing the top ten business risks to mining and metals.  In their 2014-15 publication, 
social license to operate and resource nationalism ranked numbers two and three 
respectively out of the top ten risks, and balancing talent requirements placed ninth out of 
ten (a drop from their 2013 assessment, in which skills shortage ranked number five). 
(E&Y, 2014)  Respectively, these risks relate to host-country government ownership and 
participation, community engagement, and the role of labour in achieving project 
sustainability. While each of these risk categories contains a wide range of risk factor 
subsets, collectively, they pose a considerable threat to the influence and ability of mining 
corporations to operate successfully within a given region, and contribute to the number 
one identified risk, deemed to be production efficiency.  Arguably, the need of 
organizations to maintain production levels within scope, on time and within budget is the 
key to both project and corporate success, not only in the mining industry, but generally, 
the energy & resources sector as a whole.  If not proactively mitigated, organizations may 
find themselves suffering harmful impacts to corporate reputation, restricted to capital 
funding, and by some extent, left heavily invested into a capital expenditure sunk due to 
governmental, societal or labour-level conflicts.   
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For purposes of this paper, these risks are categorized as non-financial, and are the 
premise for research into the financial implications of non-financial risks impacting major 
capital expenditure projects.  In particular, this paper reflects an interest in 2 key 
questions: 
1. To what degree does non-financial risk impact financial operating ability in 
mining related capital expenditure projects; and 
2. What elements of non-financial risk planning should be undertaken in the early 
stages of a project that would improve the probability of successful outcomes? 
 
In order to properly answer these questions, a literature review is presented that explains 
and differentiates risk factors between financial and non-financial forms of risk, along 
with typical stages of the project life cycle for mining organizations.  This forms the basis 
for risk factors that are applied to a comparative case analysis of two Canadian mining 
corporations, Barrick Gold and Go Gold Resources, both either currently or formerly 
operating wholly owned projects in less developed regions of South America.  The 
corporations’ respective positions and due diligence efforts are compared on a continuum 
of similarities and dissimilarities, in light of non-financial risk factors identified in the 
literature, and resulting impact to quarterly or annual reports and/or operational viability.  
Financial forms of risk presented in this paper are given less weighted consideration in 
our overall review, and are intended as a reference point only to provide understanding of 
the distribution of effort by organizations in pre-project acquisition and feasibility stages.   
Literature on the topic of risk in the mining industry covers a broad spectrum of issues 
and considerations.  We begin with a general overview of mining in the world economy, 
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impacts to Canadian economy, and general approaches to mining project lifecycle 
processes.  This provides the reader with a foundational understanding of the magnitude 
of global economic impact, and creates a sense of urgency for the depths of due diligence 
required in the mine acquisition and project planning process, especially given frequently 
unstable geographic operating locations and relative global financial implications 
stemming from the industry as a whole.  This also sets the stage for a presentation of 
various forms of risk to the industry, and most specifically of interest to this paper, non-
financial risk.   
KEY WORDS: Social economics, Social License, Social Impact Management, Resource 
Nationalism, Community Engagement, CSR, Skills shortage, Labour Strategies, 
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Chapter 2: Overview on Mining and the Project Lifecycle Process 
Mining is a significant driver of the world economy.  Metals are demanded in the 
construction, production and manufacturing of nearly every essential household item used 
in the world today, and extraction and processing of these resources from their natural 
environment is the primary objective of the mining industry.  The global metals and 
mining profile issued annually by Marketline defines the metals and mining industry as 
consisting of “aluminum, iron & steel, precious metals & minerals (gold, silver, platinum, 
diamonds, etc.), coal and base metal markets (lead, zinc, copper, nickel and tin).” 
(Marketline, 2014). These mineral deposits can be found in all regions of the world.  
Marketline depicts the global mining portfolio as the Americas, Asia-Pacific, Europe, and 
the Middle East, South Africa and Nigeria.  The global mining map below provides a 
visual representation of mineral deposit locations in each of these regions. 
Diagram 1 - Simplified World Mining Map 
 
Source: Wikimedia Commons 
Marketline reports that the global metals and mining industry had total revenues of 
2,844.4 billion in 2012, producing a 18,526.7 million metric tonnes in the same year, and 
forecasts accelerated industry performance over a five-year outlook between 2012-2017, 
   
5 
 
projecting growth to production value of $3,999.5 billion by the end of 2017. (Marketline, 
2014)  
 
There are hundreds of mining organizations in Canada alone, ranging from junior 
exploration to full-fledged, multi-billion dollar global industry leaders, most of which are 
publicly listed.  Approximately 57% of the world’s global mining companies are listed on 
the Toronto Stock Exchange and TSX-Venture Exchange, accounting for 48% of the 
world’s mining equity transactions. (Canadian Mining Association, Retrieved 2015) 
According to the Canadian Mining Association, mining employs approximately 380,000 
people in Canada alone, and the industry contributed 54 billion dollars to Canada’s gross 
domestic product in 2013.  (Canadian Mining Association, Retrieved 2015)  
 
Generally speaking, most mining corporations follow a fairly similar pattern in their 
approach to resource extraction and mine project lifecycle, starting with exploration, pre-
feasibility, feasibility, commissioning, implementation, and project close-out and 
reclamation.   The following diagram depicts the full mining asset cycle from resource 
discovery to project close-out: 
Diagram 2 - Mine Asset Lifecycle 
 
Source : Ernst & Young, 2015 
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Kear (2006) argues that "the mining production environment is predominantly tactical - 
effort and resources are focused on attaining a goal ... most mining operations are 
reasonably consistent in economics for a particular mining layout or design, but can be 
largely affected primarily by price (of commodities), costs, production rates and 
(expense) recoveries. (Kear, 2006) There is often a gap between the strategic and tactical 
environments, inferring that mining organizations place a heavier emphasis on cost 
containment at the tactical level, over strategic planning for long term risk 
mitigation.  The following table provided by Kear provides a highlight of the different 
objectives at each of the strategic and tactical stages of a mining operation: 
 






To determine the objectives To attain the objectives 
Obtain the best value Obtain lowest cost 
Design Implementation 
Determine limitations and constraints Identify the resources to achieve the plan 
Match the components to maximize the objective (ie. max NPV, 
IRR) 
Allocate the resources to a particular plan 
Test the effect of various strategies and scenarios Test the effect of various operating practices 
Identify variances and develop corrective strategies Identify variances and develop corrective practices 
Loose structure Tight structure 
Source: Kear,  2006 
 
We posit that, in alignment with Kear's assertion of variance between strategic and 
tactical environments, value changes can be identified largely through strategic planning 
over non-financial risk factors.  In his article, Kear contends that "value changes tend to 
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be the greatest in the strategic area (planning) whereas cost and efficiency changes tend to 
be predominant in the tactical area (the doing) ... and that value changes tend to have a 
greater magnitude of influence on the mine economics than cost issues.  (Kear, 
2006)  This further supports our suggestion that non-financial risk factors are not given 
the same level of due diligence in planning and mitigation as more clearly identifiable 
financial elements affecting a project. 
 
This research paper focuses on the evaluation and development stages of the mine plan 
(determining profitability, planning and execution phases), with a special interest in the 
organization consideration to non-financial risk,  related efforts towards due diligence at 
pre-feasibility and feasibility stages, and consequent risk factor realization at the 
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Chapter 3: Understanding Risk  
Risk comes to a project in many forms, and in varying degrees depending on the lifecycle 
stage of a project.  To simplify, we present a list of risks under the guise of two 
umbrellas: financial and non-financial risk factors. For purposes of this paper, we have 
grouped political risk under the non-financial form.  While financial implications of non-
financial risk is the primary focus of this paper, in order to accurately evaluate the 
comparison of due diligence provided thereto, we must generally understand the 
differences between the two types of risk, and the degree of profitability impact or 
financial risk assessment undertaken in pre-project acquisition stages.  This will help us to 
analyze similarities and differences, and maintain a focus on non-financial causes to 
project viability.  Additionally, a fundamental understanding of financial risk is thought to 
be necessary in order to inform possible correlations between financial and non-financial 
risk that are either collectively, or causally, impediment to project sustainability. Of 
concern to this research is the potential for financial risk being afforded a higher degree 
of effort at the evaluation stage of the mine asset cycle, due to the possibility that 
producers have a wider comprehension of clear cut, cost, revenue, and profitability issues 
impacting the global economy, as well as project viability.  In order to establish the 
baseline for risk considerations, highlights of professional white-papers are presented 
below and are cross-referenced against one-another to draw on the most significant risk 
factors to the mining industry.  Beginning with Ernst & Young (2014-2015), top ten 
business risks to mining and metals, the below diagram identifies those financial risks of 
most pressing concern to be capital dilemmas, capital projects, and price and currency 
volatility.   
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Diagram 3: 2014-15 Business risks facing mining and metals 
 
Source: E&Y, 2014 
By comparison, Deloitte, an industry leading global professional services consulting firm 
published Tracking the Trends 2015, a report revealing the results of their study regarding 
the top ten issues mining companies will face this year.  In their assessment, “mining 
companies continue to contend with price volatility, geopolitical turmoil, rising costs, 
declining grades and a general lack of access to financing”, shedding light on top 
financial risks, including  global instability, weakened commodity prices, and higher 
investor demands.  (Deloitte, February 2015)  They content that, “if mining companies 
hope to emerge from the downward cycle in a stronger position from which they entered 
it, they need to increase mining intensity and focus on reducing capital, people and energy 
intensity.” (Deloitte, February 2015).  In a separate whitepaper, Between a rock and a 
hard place (Deloitte, 2015) the firm lists their top financial concerns for the coming year 
as (i). Sky-rocketing costs; (ii) Commodity price volatility; and (iii) Inability to finance.   
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Part I: Notes on Financial Risk 
 
A high level review of consolidated financial risk factors are defined and discussed below 
as the generally accepted list of most pressing concerns regarding mining industry and 
project viability. 
a. Capital dilemmas 
In an article on operational risk, author Chong (2001) states that fund raising for mining 
has become a much more global operation with the establishment of specialized 
commodity and stock exchanges, coupled with efficient and inexpensive telecoms 
networks.  He claims that the critical decision point for investors is economic viability of 
the mine.  Chong lists key points of consideration for fundraising as strength of the 
company in the industry sector, management reputation, history of mining enterprise 
outcomes, size of investment required, and the upside value gain of metals. (Chong, 
2011)  In a 2015 review, professional consulting firm Deloitte, Touche and Tohmastu 
(collectively, Deloitte) issued a market analysis for global mining sector total return to 
shareholders, which reflected poor market pricing and returns for the industry as a whole 
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Diagram 4: Mining Total Return to Shareholders (2015) 
 
Source: Deloitte: 2015 Tracking the Trends 
Poor returns pose adverse impact to funding opportunities, where shareholder ROI has 
been trending downward.  Deloitte references most recent evaluation of capital funding 
dilemmas in that “equity financings are dwindling.  Between 2010 and 2012, TSX mining 
equity financings fell by 30%, with both the number of deals and deal values shrinking. 
Even more notable, TSX mining IPOs dropped 70% over the same time period, from $1.2 
billion in 2010 to under $400 million in 2012.” (Deloitte, 2015).   
 
The result of scarcity in capital funding places producers at a risk of significant debt to 
equity ratio, unable to carry the project through to the next upward market cycle.  
Therefore, producers must critically evaluate their production efficiency, seriously aiming 
to reduce (as opposed to traditionally exceeding) capital project budgets in order to 
remain competitively attractive to investors.  Deloitte demonstrates the gravity of the 
situation regarding capital funding through a graphical representation of the TS X/V 
mining companies balance sheets against debt ratios between 2011 and 2013: 
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Diagram 5: TS X/V Mining Companies - Cash Balances 
 
Source: Deloitte, February 2015 
Diagram 6: TS X/V Mining Companies – Total Debt 
 
 
Source: Deloitte, February 2015 
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b. Market volatility 
First and foremost, producers must consider the impacts of market volatility in metals 
pricing.  This is a significant risk factor for producers when evaluating production value 
and when assessing project opportunities.  For example, the prolonged state of depressed 
gold prices leading into 2014 significantly restricted the financial flexibility of mining 
organizations.  Additionally, the risk of fluctuating gold prices and a steady decline in 
price has resulted in the need for producers to place a heavier focus on production 
efficiency.  The Wall Street Journal reports that gold prices remain flat despite increasing 
demand, and that “gold producers need to streamline production and cut production costs 
in order to remain competitive due to the declining price of gold”. (WSJ, March 2014)  
Similarly, E&Y reports that iron ore has demonstrated a significant amount of price 
volatility in 2013-2014, with a steady decline in the last quarter.  (E&Y, 2014)   
 
Diagram 7: Iron ore price fluctuations 
 
Source: E&Y, 2014 
Forbes magazine reports that “global economic downturn and the collapse in a number of 
metal and mined commodity prices forced the mining industry to scale back investment 
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into new mine sites, reduce operating mine lives, and scale back their investment into 
more capital expenditure-heavy renewable energy.” (Martin, 2014)   
 
Fluctuating prices causes mining producers to constantly reevaluate their revenue 
potential, forcing them to cut production costs when ROI is deemed to be low, which 
strains production output and places higher demands on efficiency, especially with 
respect to labour processes and policies.  In some instances, organizations would be 
forced to withdraw the project entirely in order to maintain cash balances.  Such was the 
case with the recent cessation of the Tasiast Expansion project in Mauritania, when 
Kinross Gold Corporation announced it would stop expansion efforts entirely in an 
attempt to preserve their cash balances.  (www.kinross.com, 2015) 
 
c. Currency volatility 
Foreign currency presents significant risk to operational viability.  Transaction risk occurs 
with the physical conversion of one currency to another … and results in a realized 
foreign exchange gain or loss. (Murray, 2005)  “To maintain price and exchange rate 
stability, many emerging market and developing countries (EMDCs) de facto peg their 
exchange rates, intervening in the foreign exchange markets, but without formally 
committing to a peg.”  (Ghosh, 2014) This objective is to maintain price stability … 
“especially in emerging market economies that have a history of high inflation …” 
(Ghosh, 2014).  Price stability is a crucial risk factor for organizations seeking to establish 
project entities in emerging markets that have demonstrated a history of currency 
volatility.  Influenced by the degree of capital mobility and financial integration due to 
globalization, currency crises occurs when massive capital outflows force a country to 
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devalue or float its currency.  (Marghescu, 2010) Resulting impacts to investor 
organizations with entities in these markets conclude significant losses to host-country 
entities and project operations due to overdependence on local resources combined with 
poor financial governance, or poor hedging policies.   
 
As such, mining firms must remain cognizant of currency regimes and general price 
stability in their desired areas of operation, and more-so, the larger impact of a country’s 
currency fluctuations on global trading and investor relations.   
 
d. Rising energy costs and capital expenditures 
Deloitte lists cost inflation as the #1 risk factor to the mining industry, primarily due to 
fluctuating energy costs, and reports that expansion capital expenditures rose 400% 
between the periods of 2005-2013. (Deloitte, 2015) Mining firms must keep a watchful 
eye on cost inflation impacting their capital expenditures.  Concerns regarding the rising 
costs of resources and supplies have added pressure to production efficiency, and to the 
necessity to remain within budget.  Rising costs have a resounding impact, not only on 
firms’ ability to secure financing for developmental phases, but also to ensure that they do 
not run out of resources prior to project completion.   
Part II: Non-Financial Risk 
 
We identify nonfinancial risk factors in the same way as we did for financial risk factors 
above - Through cross-referencing of professional whitepapers against academic 
publications, and in an effort to employ evidenced based management principles of 
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design. Whitepapers are primarily those released by Ernst & Young and Deloitte 
(2014/2015 publications).  
 
Reichardt presents his research on the Due Diligence Assessment of Nonfinancial Risk, 
wherein he states that mining companies are "generally unable to grow organically at a 
rate acceptable to their shareholders" which leads to an increasing number of mergers and 
acquisitions of mining projects and corporations.  His research evaluates nonfinancial 
issues to be considered in the assessment of purchasing mining projects wherein he 
argues that " in most instances, non-financial issues will not be material enough to make 
or break a project… however particularly in times of volatile commodity prices, a series 
of poorly managed issues may combine to pose a material risk to the project pipeline ... 
and that costs arising from a failure to understand or effectively manage environmental or 
social issues could include (but not necessarily be limited to) loss of production, extra 
security requirements, costs associated with dispute resolution, and additional data 
gathering and verification for stakeholder engagement. (Reichardt, 2006)  He includes a 
table highlighting the spectrum of non-financial issues that need to be considered during 
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Table 2: Spectrum of Non-Financial Issues 
Environmental Social Workplace Other 
Non-compliance with 
environmental legislation or 
permits 
Pending land or compensation 
claims 





economic conditions of 
project finance 
Non-delivery on commitments 
made to stakeholders 
Occupational disease (e.g. 
silicosis, asbestosis) 
Political instability and/or 
xenophobia 
Non-compliance with 
industry codes of practice to 
which the company or site is 
a signatory 
Antagonistic relations with 
external stakeholders 
HIV/AIDS Security of tenure 
Disposal of mine waste Requirement for involuntary 
resettlement 
Other endemic diseases (e.g. 
malaria) 
Relationship with potential 
Joint Venture partners 
Use of processes, technologies 




artisanal/small scale miners 
Workplace and employee 
security 
Risk to company reputation 
Inadequate financial 
provision for closure and 
rehabilitation / reclamation 
Dependence on mine 
infrastructure that will not be 
retained post-closure 
Industrial relations The company’s reputation for 
management of non-financial 
risk for other projects 
 
Source:  Reichardt, 2006: Table 1, p.194 
 
We put forward blanket umbrella terms for nonfinancial risk and for purposes of this 
research, nonfinancial risk factors are considered to be those risks that are most relevant 
to social and labour economics, and community engagement. In this regard, we evaluate 
Deloitte’s reference to stakeholder engagement, and Reichardt's reference to 
environmental risks as relevant to the E&Y reference to social license to 
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operate/community engagement. These nonfinancial risks have been collated and 
presented under umbrella terms for forming of this paper, to include resource nationalism, 
social license to operate, and country risk.  While labour infers both highly qualified and 
low skilled labour, we have grouped labour under the term of social license for its 
relevance to skills development of unskilled labour pools within the host country.  Each 
of these risk factors is highlighted below, with a more in-depth presentation of literature 
surrounding the subset of risks that collectively make up the umbrella term. 
 
a. Social License to Operate (SLO) and Social Impact Management 
We interpret social license to mean the acceptance, inclusion and participation of thee 
citizens of local communities, and that social impact management refers to the attempt at 
enacting policies, processes and governance structures that identify and manages issues or 
concerns that directly impact the citizens of those communities.  Reichardt (2006) states 
that losing the "social license to operate is probably the single greatest threat to mining 
operations throughout the developing world”. He references the following definition of 
social license: the "acceptance and belief by society, and specifically our local 
communities in the value creation of our activities". (Reichardt, 2006)  Ernst & Young 
(2014) states that, there is a significant opportunity that exists for organizations to make a 
positive contribution to the broader society by integrating activities required to 
obtain/maintain a social license into the strategic plan of a more sustainable business" 
(E&Y, 2014).  They go on to argue that the “risk of losing a license to operate must be 
constantly assessed, ensuring the right controls are in place” … and that a “failure of 
control can quickly put an organization into crisis, with significant financial and 
reputational impacts to the business. Furthermore, it can also take a long time to restore 
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the credibility required to regain acceptance by stakeholders, resulting in further delays 
and impacts.” (E&Y, 2014)  
 
Fundamentally the notion of social license rests on the community expectation for the 
producer to "act responsibly, deliver on commitments, and provide an equitable share of 
the benefits that the operation generates " (E&Y, 2014) Reichardt (2006) states that, 
"under extreme circumstances affected communities withdrawal of support for, and 
sometimes active opposition to a mining operation may jeopardize projects that are under 
development and can cripple the cash for mines that are already in production".  
Additionally, he supports the contention of due diligence assessment of non-financial risk 
by highlighting that "the materiality of the resulting impacts of (social license issues) on 
the financial performance of (a mine project), as well as on the share value and reputation 
of the parent company ... raises the question of whether companies considering the 
purchase of other assets where similar social issues arise, would be equipped to identify 
these material not financial risks during the due diligence process, such that risks could be 
factored into the decision of whether or not to proceed with purchase and, if so, the 
calculation of fair value for the asset. (Reichardt, 2006) 
 
Deloitte puts forward their perspective on companies’ struggle to balance competing 
interests regarding stakeholder and community engagement. In their publication, 
Tracking the Trends (2015), they claim that "although mining companies have made 
significant strides in their dealings with local communities… many organizations still lag 
at effective stakeholder engagement ... which is partly due to the fact that the number of 
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stakeholders keep growing." They assert that, "winning a license to operate today often 
means negotiating with dozens of different local communities, various levels of 
government, numerous government departments, non-governmental organizations, 
workers unions, local labor forces, environmental groups, industry associations and much 
more vocal shareholders. Deloitte is quoted as saying that, "the mining industry does not 
fully understand the complexities associated with stakeholder engagement" and that "too 
often, relationships with stakeholders are adversarial instead of collaborative". (Deloitte, 
February 2015). Essentially the contention is that we need to give before we can expect to 
receive.  
 
Kemp et al., publishes in the journal of business ethics (2011) on just relations and 
company – community conflict in mining, wherein the researchers argue that real and 
ongoing challenges of mining include intractable, local level conflict, emerging global 
norms and performance standards, and ever increasing expectations for the industry to 
translate high-level corporate social responsibility policy into on the ground practice. 
(Kemp, et al., 2010) She indicates that mining companies are frequently accused of either 
knowingly or inadvertently causing conflict or exasperating existing grievances within 
communities… and that such conflicts are usually motivated by community concerns that 
relate to economic or livelihood security; land or water access, ownership, use or 
degradation; environmental effects; gendered impacts; impacts on social cohesion and 
cultural beliefs; treatment and claims of human rights violations and other injustices; 
disparities between the distribution of benefits and risks; and the very meaning of 
development. (Kemp et al., 2010) She puts forward the need for interactional and value 
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based dimensions of the company-community relationship that must also be considered 
when evaluating company interpretation and response to community relationships, and 
offers up avenues to address corporate community conflict through the establishment of 
grievance systems, or specific requirements for mine sites to have mechanisms of dispute 
resolution as part of an overall corporate social responsibility policy. (Kemp et al., 2010) 
In this respect, it may be easily deduced that participation and inclusion of community 
ideology, concern, and feedback in the feasibility and mine planning stages of the project 
is fundamental to forging positive and long-term social licenses, and that in order to 
adequately establish effective policies of participation and inclusion, producers must take 
a proactive approach to conducting due diligence regarding social license risks, and 
mitigation strategies at the pre-acquisition stages. In this sense it seems fair to assert that 
we cannot adequately govern what we do not understand.  
 
Prno (2013) publishes in resources policy on an analysis of factors leading to the 
establishment of social license to operate in the mining industry. In his research, he 
presents that communication challenges, generally, and difficulties in reconciling 
different knowledge sources, more particularly, have affected miners ability to earn a 
SLO ... and that mining organizations must now focus on "creating space for dialogue 
with local communities and encouraging greater community involvement in the 
development of related decision-making."  In presenting his discussion, Prno notes a key 
point surrounding the context within which miners aim to operate, highlighting that "there 
are no generalizations… each mine site is unique" and that SLO is "community specific". 
He claims that too often people look for a one-size-fits-all solution. (Prno, 2013)  He 
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concludes by stating that community specific variables are particularly important drivers 
of SLO outcomes", including community needs, expectations, and aspirations, culture and 
values, experiences with and perceptions of mining, and the effectiveness of local 
governance institutions. (Prno, 2013) 
 
(i) Labour as a source of conflict 
Another consideration with respect to earning SLO is often realized over tensions 
regarding sources of labor and community employment opportunities. The journal of 
business ethics publishes on labor relations and ethical dilemmas of extractive MNE's in 
Africa, where tensions over pay, expatriate employment as against the locals, negotiation 
rights and employee well-being are referenced as considerably influential to mining 
project viability. (Eweie, 2009) This is a pressing issue for all mining organizations in 
light of the established war for talent and skills shortage in the mining sector globally.  In 
a 2012 release by the Canadian Institute for Mining, Martha Roberts reports on the 
mining Industry Human Resources Council (MiHR) annual hiring requirements 
forecast.  The 2011 report estimates the need to hire over 100,000 workers between 2011 
and 2021, with labour shortages driven by an aging workforce, stiffer competition with 
other industries, and challenges in attracting and engaging key talent groups.  (Roberts, 
2012)  MiHR follows up with their 10 year outlook published in 2013, stating that "over 
the next ten years, mining's projected hiring requirements exceed 145,000 workers, 
representing more than half the current workforce ... and that labour market trends include 
(i) increasing need for trades and production occupations; (ii) demographics of an aging 
workforce; (iii) loss of talent in leadership positions and low priority on succession 
planning and leadership development; (iv) immigration as a key source of mining talent -
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  attracting immigrants to remote locations and foreign credential recognition; (v) young 
people are not attracted to mining due to lifestyle, lack of opportunity and poor site-level 
management; and (vi) need for industry and education partnerships for aboriginal 
people.  (MiHR Report, 2013)  
 
Gupta and Govindarajan (2001) note that "many countries with relatively lower wage 
rates also suffer from lower levels of productivity", but that is it possible for a company to 
locate production in a low-labor-cost country and still achieve world-class productivity 
and quality levels under the following conditions: the developing economy has a large 
pool of highly educated workers (such as India, China and the Philippines); high 
unemployment levels furnish  the multinational firm with a very talented and motivated 
pool of employees; and the company is setting up greenfield operations, where it is 
possible to establish world class processes from day one".  (Gupta and Govindarajan, 
2001).   
 
In order to achieve adequate production levels in (often underdeveloped) mining 
regions,  talent development strategies of mining organizations  must address critical 
skills deficits through a combination of academic and applied education, rotational 
assignments and applied training, and safety awareness perspectives.  The ongoing 
challenge for organizations is to achieve a perceived amount of procedural and 
distributive fairness in their talent investment strategies, considering the need to balance 
production efficiency against social and economic beneficiation of the host 
country.  Outsourcing of labour has often resulted in considerable backlash from host 
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communities due to an array of perceived indifferences or disrespect by foreigners 
towards local community culture, and/or hindrance of social-economic growth.  D. Pillay 
(1999) provides insight into these concerns in a report on the consequence to local 
communities from outsourcing, where he holds that "outsourcing and subcontracting 
often means "job losses, lower wages, inferior working conditions, job insecurity, ultra-
exploitation, lower health and safety standards, and lower environmental standards".  He 
goes on to assert that subcontracting is often "directed at lowering the standards and 
employment conditions ... (and) is a dominant practice (in the mining industry)".  (Pillay,  
1999).   
 
Labour related conflicts have resulted in work stoppages and safety issues for mining 
projects globally, including the 2013 example of community uprising against Barrick 
Gold’s Pueblo Viejo project in the Dominican Republic in 2010 and again in 2012, when 
workers went on strike demanding better working conditions, and where violent 
outbreaks resulted in at least one death and multiple injuries.  In 2012, residents of Cotuí 
community organized a march to demand that Barrick give more jobs to local community 
residents instead of foreigners. The violence that ensued led to at least 25 injuries. 
(MICLA, Retrieved March 2015) 
 
Labour related issues and potential conflicts must be proactively identified with 
mitigation strategies devised in an effort to balance a tripartite workforce consisting of the 
right mix of expatriate (highly qualified specialists), with often unskilled local community 
workers, and other semi-skilled third country nationals (TCN's).   




Risk #1: Labour availability in the host community 
 
Risk #2: Degree of qualified skills associated with available labour in the host 
community 
 
Risk #3: Cost of investment to training balanced against production efficiency  
 
Risk #4: Perceived distributive and procedural fairness regarding equitable 
employment standards and pay 
 
Risk #5: General safety concerns regarding corporate/community conflict 
regarding labour relations 
 
(ii) Culture as a source of conflict 
Adler provides Kroeber and Kluckhohn's definition of culture as consisting of patterns 
explicit and implicit of and for behavior acquired and transmitted by symbols constituting 
the distinctive achievement of human groups including their embodiment artifacts; the 
essential core of culture consists of traditional (i.e.) historically derived and selected ideas 
and especially their attached values; culture systems may on the one hand be considered 
as products of action, on the other, as conditioning elements of future action.  Culture is 
therefore something shared by all or almost all members of the given social group - 
something older members of the group pass on to younger members and something, as in 
the case of morals, laws, and customs that shape behavior, or structures ones perception 
of the world.   The cultural orientation of the society reflects a complex interaction of 
values, attitudes and behaviors displayed by the members. (Adler, 2008)    
 
Just as the North American work ethic is rooted in theories characterized by the times of 
Taylorism and more modern day evolution of work behaviors geared towards optimizing 
production output, variances in cultural beliefs, attitudes and customs have shaped work 
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behaviors of other, more remote and less developed communities in which the mining 
sector operates.  Often those communities, being less developed and/or technically skilled 
than our own, may display work behaviors that do not necessarily demonstrate a sense of 
urgency over efficiency and/or productivity.   That being said, we do not strictly limit our 
idea of culture as a source of conflict to differences in cross-cultural management 
perspectives, but broaden our scope to include a more holistic perspective on the 
acceptance and inclusion of cross cultural beliefs, norms customs and ideas into mining 
organization and site level programs, policies and procedures at both the organization 
wide, and site level strategic planning, as well as individual employee attitudes and/or 
respect towards host county and community norms and beliefs.   
 
Mining organizations must provide a considerable amount of time to understanding 
cultural attitudes and beliefs of the host country within which they aim operate, in order 
to fully comprehend and mitigate risks affiliated with cross cultural conflicts between 
developed, (Canadian, for example) and host country attitudes, not only towards work 
ethic, but also towards social behaviour.   Tihanyi, et al., (2005) offers that cultural 
distance and international business research assumes that differences between foreign and 
home country cultures increase the cost of entry, decrease operational benefits, and 
restrict the firm's ability to transfer core competencies to foreign markets.  He also states 
that increased operational difficulties result from cultural distance due to a lack of 
understanding of the norms values and institutions that afford social exchange across 
markets.  Cultural distance may also lead to higher levels of complexity and uncertainty 
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for managerial decision-making regarding eminent strategies and organizational choices. 
(Tihanyi et al., 2005) 
 
Puck (2008) states that cultural adjustment is considered to be a prerequisite for expatriate 
success abroad, and that cultural distance necessitates cross cultural training to enhance 
knowledge and awareness of appropriate norms and behaviours of the host country.  He 
argues however that, few organizations systematically evaluate or validate the 
effectiveness of their training programmes.  (Puck et al., 2008) While his study did not 
support the assumed relationship between cross cultural training participation and 
comprehensiveness to increased expatriate adjustment, Puck found that language 
competence was a stronger source of competitive advantage in international 
business.  (Puck, et al., 2008).   
 
Expatriate adjustment has been a research focus of particular interest in international 
business due to the high rate of failure and resulting cost.  Michael Harvey, et al. (1999) 
suggests that the increasing complexity of expatriate assignments and the increasing rate 
of failure of expatriate managers necessitate the requirement for greater attention to 
socializing and mentoring expatriates while overseas. (Harvey, et al., 1999).  His research 
suggests that a global mentoring program promotes the success of international 
assignments by enhancing personal, relational and professional integration into the host 
country culture, designed to facilitate expatriate adjustment through a social support 
process, and in an effort to accelerate understanding of cultural differences between the 
home and host country. (Harvey, et al., 1999)   




The preceding research has important implications for mining in that, mining projects 
require long and extended periods of time to be spent in host countries, often while living 
in circumstances far less developed or understood than our home culture.  As such, when 
devising a framework for non-financial risk factors and corresponding mitigation plans, 
MNC's should include the high degree of failure of expatriate assignments due to poor 
personal and family adjustment to the host community, cultural and lingual 
misunderstanding.   
 
While research on expatriate adjustment brings forward necessary components of 
expatriate readiness with respect to cultural distance and culture as a source of conflict, it 
lacks address to the nature of cross cultural training in the reverse.   As an extension of 
their research, we suggest that cross-cultural training must not only be directed at the 
expatriate managers and/or highly qualified entrants (and their families) to the host 
country, but that, to successfully employ country nationals in any facet, culture and 
language training must also be devised in the reverse, such that host-country nationals 
gain comprehension for the owner MNC's home-country and organizational culture and 
working expectations.  This paper suggest a correlation between the degree of inclusion 
of local workers into MNC strategic and cross-cultural training plans, as fundamental risk 
factors to the success rate of any project capital expenditure mining project, and that 
social impact management strategies/planning must encompass a much broader intention 
beyond mere expatriate entry. 
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Risk #6: Expatriate comprehension and readiness, and quality of pre-
departure and ongoing cross cultural and language training  
 
Risk #7: National level comprehension and cross cultural training programs 
geared to enhancing reverse understanding of MNC driven individual 
and corporate culture along with social behaviours 
 
Risk #8: Degree of communications planning to enhance cross-cultural 
understanding the total workforce and surrounding community 
 
 
b. Resource Nationalism 
Resource nationalism refers to the increasing demand of host country governments to 
retain ownership and control over the production environment and projects taking place in 
their countries. Ernst & Young posits that "the new world of resource nationalism is a 
balancing act between promoting investment and maximizing in country benefits." (E&Y, 
2014).  Ward (2009) offers the following context and definition of resource nationalism, 
stating that, “foreign direct investment is often characterized as an attempt to annex the 
resources of a foreign country” through “land-grabbing”, and that resource nationalism 
characterizes host countries increasing response with counter-measures to protect 
sovereignty over national assets.  Deloitte cites resource nationalism or engaging with the 
government as the 9
th
 risk on their 2015 Tracking the Trends review, wherein they note 
that host country governments pose a challenge to mining operations through hard-walled 
legislation and imposition of various taxes on labour, supply chain, production and 
revenue, resulting in considerable cost increase to mining MNC’s.  They cite a few 
examples of governments that continue to make it harder for mining companies to operate 
profitably in their countries, such as in Mexico with the introduction of a 7.5% tax on 
mining revenues, Ecuador, with a 70% windfall tax on mining, and Chile’s imposition of 
a tax reform causing a 25% raise to corporate.  Additionally, both Bolivia and Argentina 
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nationalized mines and have taken steps to revoke some companies’ mining rights. 
(Deloitte, 2015).   
 
When considering the motivational factors for resource nationalism, Ward (2009) argues 
that “today’s resource nationalism, unlike that of the 1970s, needs to be understood in the 
context of global concern for resource security, climate change, sustainable development 
and poverty reduction” … and that … “all are inter-related.” She goes on to provide a 
more detailed explanation of the differences between nationalism (the intra-national 
struggle for control of resources), economic nationalism (policies which are guided by the 
idea of protecting domestic consumption, labour and capital),  and protectionism 
(generally expressed in terms of trade policies imposed for the protection of a nation’s 
producers or enterprises from competition).  (Ward, 2009)  In evaluating the implications 
of resource nationalism, this paper presents disagreement with Ward’s position on 
nationalism under the spectrum of resource nationalism, in that she describes nationalism 
in a sense to be closely related to social license.  We differentiate resource nationalism 
from social license related risks, in that we perceive social license matters to directly 
impact the citizens at a micro-level in their everyday way of life, which may causes 
community uprising at the citizen level.  Conversely, we view resource nationalism 
matters in consideration of benefit to the state, and whether it entails increasing levels of 
mandated beneficiation to the political economy.   
 
For purposes of this paper, we consider resource nationalism achievements to be related 
to an acceptance of the MNC into the host country by host country legislative and 
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governmental authorities, and believe that the MNC has fostered sufficient levels of 
resource nationalism when the governing body is cooperative in establishing or 
promoting regulations that facilitates mining supply chains, labour mobilization and 
production in the country.  Deloitte argues that “While some governments are working to 
accommodate the industry, others are backing miners into a corner and are in danger of 
killing the goose that laid the golden egg if their policies force companies to defer their 
investments or exit a country entirely.” (Deloitte, 2015).  A recent example of mining 
MNC challenges due to lack of governmental participation and restrictive policies can be 
found in the 2011 withdrawal of Canadian based Kinross Gold Corporation from the 
Fruta del Norte gold mining project in Ecuador.  The Financial Post reported that Kinross 
paid US $1.2 billion for the project in 2008, but did not proceed with development after 
the government imposed a punitive windfall profits tax … and that Ecuador is rife with 
political problems impacting mining feasibility.  (Humphreys, 2015) 
 
We suggest that achieving sufficient government cooperation is particularly challenging, 
but necessary and important for mining MNC's due to the geographic location of many 
rich mineral deposits in countries often deemed to have poor governance quality.   Chang, 
et al., (2012) argues that MNE’s who enter a country with poor governance quality face 
higher risk in terms of their ability to collaborate in all areas of negotiation over equity 
ownership and related operational policy and process determination.  The authors provide 
that “governance infrastructure represents the entire formal institutional environment of a 
country … and covers the “overall public institutions and policies created by governments 
as a framework for economic, legal, and social relations”, and that “governance quality 
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has a profound influence on foreign MNE’s.  (Chang, et al., 2012).  Chang claims that the 
most important influence of poor governance quality is its negative effects on contracting, 
that is to say, increased difficulty in negotiating the proper terms of a contract.  In 
presenting the results of their research, the authors discuss the concept of “governance 
hazards” which they define as “formal institutional hazards resulting from a country’s 
overall governance infrastructure (e.g. poor political, legal and social systems).” (Chang, 
et al., 2012).   
 
A combination of governance quality and corruption may also be thought to influence the 
propensity of host-country government to re-invest in economic growth and sustainability 
of the country.  MNC’s may face challenges in the demand for investment to social 
programs, where the government seeks financial gain under the guise of social 
development, but fails to return the benefit to their own society, such as through enhanced 
education and health programs.  The possible ideological conflict here is the practical 
need and use of an educated workforce to benefit in-country labour retention and mining 
production (as financed by mine MNC’s) versus the possibility that an increasingly 
educated workforce results in democratization and uprising against corrupt, authoritarian, 
or generally dysfunctional government institutions.  Oketch (2006) speaks to the benefits 
of an educated society in that “education and research include contributions to a society 
with functioning democratic institutions and their related freedoms … to lower crime 
rates, and better functioning economy with improved literacy, adaptability and 
understanding.  (Oketch, 2006).   
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Depending on the national political climate of the governing party, benefits may also be 
restricted to pre-selected or qualifying state authorities for personal gain over and above 
citizen development. Interactions or policies that may be characterized by government 
and authoritative corruption, bribery, facilitation demands, or targeted and nepotism 
influences to labour and employment programs, mandated (and targeted) education 
programs, imposition of high windfall taxes, and/or other government led initiatives 
aimed at improving the economy (or immediate political party) are a few examples of 
possible risk factors causing significant financial hardship to an MNC that should be 
addressed in the due diligence process over new project acquisition.  Additionally, 
government attitudes towards procurement for services, and quality or trustworthiness 
with respect to upholding contractual agreements are factors to be considered when 
evaluating risks relevant to resource nationalism.   
 
We consider the relevance of governance quality and corruption to resource nationalism, 
in that, mining MNC’s must weigh the likelihood that host-country government demands 
and/or willingness to negotiate fair contracts will (a) not conflict with home country 
governance and legislative parameters; (b) not risk the financing opportunities earned 
from other project stakeholders; (c) not pose a reputational risk to the MNC itself; and (d) 
have some reciprocal benefit to growing and sustaining the local labour pool for 
operational benefit to the organization and the project.  Mining MNC’s must be cautious 
in their approach to risk identification and mitigation surrounding legislative and political 
environments, so as not to be too heavily influenced in a manner deemed to be unethical, 
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especially in light of research that supports the notion over variation of MNC business 
ethics based on the socio-economic factors of their host-countries.  (Onsel, 2013) 
 
In our evaluation of resource nationalism considerations, we consider a high-level 
overview of literature on factors deemed to be politically led or government initiated, 
including taxation policies, supply chain policies, and other factors affecting contract 
administration.  We also consider the quality of the host country governance structure and 
resulting impact to MNC and mining project viability.  We posit that risk factors 
associated to issues of resource nationalism are those factors causing production 
stoppages, restrictions and limitations due to poor government relations, and include such 
concerns as host-country government corruption, political instability, and greed, as well 
as a general lack of understanding on how to communicate and negotiate for mutual 
productive and economic gain.    
 
Arguably, resource nationalism is the more modern depiction of corporate social 
responsibility (CSR), a global best practice approach to social, environmental and 
economic beneficiation amongst nationally and internationally operating firms.  This is 
not to say that organizations must do away with principles of CSR, but that resource 
nationalism requires much more than a well-intentioned, do-gooder approach to country 
beneficiation.  We posit that non-financial risk analysis must encompass a thorough 
assessment of the willingness and ability of the host country government, not only to 
participate in productive and cooperative policy-making, but also accept responsibility for 
encouraging economic development by properly distributing the realized benefits of 
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MNC investment.  Additionally, When evaluating risk factors and devising mitigation 
strategies to address issues pertaining to resource nationalism,  organizations must look 
not only at the ability of the host country government to provide proper infrastructure, but 
the willingness of the government to participate in generating positive economic returns 
through its use of policy.  MNC's must not assume that because we, as highly resourceful 
and developed organizations, have the means to offer economic growth to a host country, 
that this facilitates the willingness or acceptance of the host country to be improved 
through our methods.  Risk analysis must weigh the cost associated with rising 
government demands for beneficiation, against production gains to be realized over the 
lifespan of a project.  An imbalance of these factors may lead to a creeping amount of 
unrecoverable sunk cost.   
 
Risk #9: Degree of government quality, attitude and trust towards contract 
administration  
 
Risk #10: Government tax policy in respect of energy & resources 
 
Risk #11: Legislative framework surrounding ownership over supply chain 
and/or production efforts 
 
Risk #12: Perceived balance of government demand, investment in social 
programs, and reciprocal benefit to MNC project and long term 
operation 
 
Risk #13: Balancing investment for social development against reputation, ethics 
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c. Country Risk 
A number of different considerations of country risk have been presented in literature 
reviews surrounding country analysis and MNE decision to enter a host-country. In a 
1997 review, Dyck (1997) published in Harvard Business Review that the objective of 
country analysis is to build a picture of the national business environment.  He speaks to 
the most important task of country analysis as the identification and evaluation of 
relationships amongst strategy, context and performance, referring to strategy as a 
“nation’s implicit and explicit goals and the policies designed to achieve those goals”, and 
context as the “resources, players, and rules of the game”, which leads to performance.  
Performance is evaluated by the country’s “economic, political and social” state of 
wellness.  (Dyck, 1997).  In reviewing literature on the topic of country analysis, it 
appears a great deal of research has focused on the business environment, including a 
heavy focus on government stability and corruption, or the degree to which the host-
country government enacts policy, procedure or strategies geared towards economic and 
social development. It seems impossible to approach the topic of international business 
without encountering literature on corruption.  While we have covered a high level review 
of corruption above under the guise of resource nationalism, corruption may be evaluated 
on a number of different levels.  Regarding resource nationalism, we looked to the 
propensity of the state to unilaterally enact legislative restrictions against mining MNE’s 
for purposes of economic gain, and referred to corruption in the context of political 
advancement and/or poor governance quality regarding contractual agreements.  With 
respect to country analysis, we view corruption in terms of the everyday business 
environment of both government and non-government officials, including the ideology of 
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small, artisan business owners regarding business relationships with MNE’s and regular 
contracts for services. 
    
(i) Corruption  
In a 2006 research study, Rodriguez et al. (2006) released an analysis on the three lenses 
of multinational enterprise: politics, corruption and corporate social responsibility, 
where they focused on the relationship between international business and host-country 
society.  They took a particular interest in the unresolved “embryonic” issues between 
social, economic and political institutions that guide MNE entry decision.  Corruption is 
discussed in terms of the difference between public (government) and private (business 
entity) effects on the MNE firm, and the authors make a point to highlight that in some 
instances, it may be difficult to discern corruption from political lobbying, or legitimate 
political strategy.  (Rodriguez, et al., 2006)   
 
In an article discussing the relationships between corruption, underdevelopment and the 
extractive resource industries, O’Higgins criticizes the World Bank definition of 
corruption for overlooking the role of companies and business entities in advancing 
corruption.  The World Bank refers to corruption as “the abuse of public office for private 
gain.” (World Bank, Retrieved March 21, 2015) O’Higgins refers to important types of 
corruption beyond government initiated bribes when she speaks about “one time, one-of-
a-kind, high-value transactions, which offer unique opportunities to both sides to make 
substantial gains for themselves at the expense of legitimate beneficiaries.” (O’Higgins, 
2006)  She continues by stating that “as part of their development initiatives, high growth 
developing countries are usually engaged in large-scale infrastructure projects … and 
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where developing countries are a source of cheap abundant labour and of critical 
extractive resources like oil and minerals … corrupt payments may be the only way for 
multinationals to gain priority access to markets, contracts and assets in some countries.”  
She goes on to point out that “particular types of foreign direct investment in developing 
countries represent significant commitment of capital” (such as large infrastructure or oil 
extraction projects) … and that “once established, the sunk costs make it extremely 
unattractive to pull out, even in the face of rising demands for corrupt payments.” She 
states that “the exploitations of natural resources requires tremendous amounts of capital 
investment and technological know-how, not possessed by developing countries” … and 
to realize their resource wealth, they are dependent on foreign companies to make 
necessary investments” but that due to “geographic luck”, corrupt governments have the 
upper hand because MNE’s are unfamiliar with the typically rough and arduous terrain of 
the operating environment, which makes them dependent on host-country nationals for 
navigation.” (O’Higgins, 2006) 
 
Transparency International, a leading coalition sponsored by the World Bank focused on 
the fight against corruption, puts out their annual Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 
measuring perceived levels of public-sector corruption levels in 175 countries globally.  
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Table 3 - 2014 Corruption Perception Index 
 
   
40 
 
Table 3.1 - 2014 Corruption Perception Index (cont’d) 
 
(Source: Transparency International, 2014 CPI Brochure) 
By comparison of the 2014 CPI World Map and corresponding tables against the 
Simplified World Mining Map shown in Diagram 1 (in part 2 of this paper) we can see a 
considerable overlap in the geographic location of the world’s resources to countries of 
high-risk on the corruption index.  This poses a significant challenge for mining firms 
seeking to operate in these regions, where demand-side corruption is perceived to be a 
rampant way of doing business. While the CPI focuses on public sector corruption, a 
correlation between public sector and private sector ideology of host country business 
conduct and ethics likely exists, although literature on corruption seems more widely 
focused on government and public sector transactions.   
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On a final note regarding corruption considerations, is the degree to which the 
competitive environment of MNE’s is likely to engage in corrupt practices.  It seems 
plausible to assert that, the competitive market approach to combatting corruption can 
only be upheld in circumstances where all firms operating in a high-risk region abide by 
the same general ethical principles.   Transparency International reports on perceived 
supply-side corruption through issuance of the Bribe Payers Index by country of origin 
and industry sector, where 10 indicates never bribes and 0 indicates always bribes, as 
follows: 
 
Table 4: 2011 Bribe Payers Index by Country 
 
Source: Transparency International, BPI 2011 
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Table 4.1: 2011 - Bribe Payers Index by Industry Sector 
 
Source: Transparency International, BPI 2011 
Highlights of supply side corruption have been rekindled with the recent charges brought 
against Montreal based engineering firm SNC Lavalin for corruption and fraud.  The 
Globe and Mail reports that, “the RCMP last month laid rare corporate fraud and 
corruption charges against SNC-Lavalin Group, its unit SNC-Lavalin Construction Inc., 
as well as subsidiary SNC-Lavalin International Inc., as part of the force’s continuing 
investigation into the company’s business dealings in Libya.” (Van Praet, 2015) In a 
separate article, the Globe and Mail reported that “there is one count of corruption related 
to at least $47.7-million in alleged bribes to Libyan public or other officials. A second 
count is for fraud of about $130-million related to construction projects in Libya, 
including the Great Man Made River Project.”  (Marotte, 2015)  This is a significant blow 
for Canadian companies, drawing attention to the heightened importance for risk 
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mitigation in these areas of unstable political environments, as well as the criminal and 
business implications for MNE’s home based operations. 
 
To summarize on corruption and the implications for mining MNE’s, firms must pay 
particular attention to the ideology regarding foreign transactions within host-countries, 
both at the public and private, and firm and individual level, as well as evaluating the 
approach by competitors in a similar industry when operating in these same countries. 
 
Risk #14: Degree to which host-country falls on the spectrum of public sector 
corruption 
 
Risk #15: Probability of corrupt practices in small business operations and local 
contracts 
 
Risk #16: Propensity of competitors to uphold ethical business practices in 
similar operating regions 
 
 
(ii) Political Violence & Global Security 
It is impossible to speak about country analysis without considering the degree of security 
risk MNE’s face with operating in some of the most politically unstable and globally 
insecure regions in the world.  Media reports are wrath with risks associated to personal 
safety and security, and mining firm MNE’s must invest a significant amount of resources 
towards personal and environmental safety and protection.  In the wake of rising global 
challenges in the Middle East, civil and organized terrorists groups in Africa, and security 
concerns over cartel and drug trades in Mexico and South America, one must consider the 
value to be placed on an individual’s life, and the cost/benefit of having to mitigate risks 
associated with local lawlessness and global security threat.  We need not look too far 
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beyond news media to gain an understanding of the serious threat to individual safety in 
some of the world’s most popular mining regions.  A few excerpts of recent reports are 
listed below: 
Kidnapped Goldcorp Miners found dead in Mexico (March 16, 2015) 
Info mine reports that “Three of the four Goldcorp (TSX:G), (NYSE:GG) employees 
believed to have been abducted last week have been found dead in southwestern 
Mexico's Guerrero state, the same area where 43 students were kidnapped and 
massacred last year.”  The fourth miner kidnapped was released.  (Jasamie, 2015) 
 
Gunmen Kidnap 12 near South Mexico gold mine (February 8, 2015) 
BBC reports on the kidnapping of employees at Torex Gold (TSX:TXG) where 
armed men in Mexico kidnapped at least 12 people in the southern state of 
Guerrero.  This is the same area where 43 students were abducted and murdered 
last year by the local gang, Guerrors Unidos. (BBC.com, 2015) 
 
Kidnapping of Canadian highlights risk of mining in Columbia (August 28, 2013) 
CBC reports on the kidnapping of mining executive, Gernot Woeber, VP of 
Exploration for Canadian firm Braevel mines in Columbia, and the resulting 
decision of Braevel to abandon the mine over security issues.  In the report, CBC 
draws attention to the fine line between risk and reward for miners seeking to do 
business in Columbia due to the opposition of foreign exploitation of resources.   
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While these incidences focus on intra-country groups, larger forms of terrorism across the 
globe have also been experienced and pose a significant threat to mining and extractive 
resource industry security.  At the 2014 mining security and crisis management forum, 
held in Capetown, Africa, attention has been brought to the rising concerns over terrorism 
and political instablity in the Africa and the Middle East, with specific reference being 
made to the 2013 kidnappings in Algeria.  The forum reported that “Terrorism and the 
potential impact on extractive industries across Africa is a growing concern. In 2013 the 
mining world was shocked by the deadly terrorist attack on the Areva mine in Niger, 
which was carried out by the Signed in Blood Batallion (AQIM). It subsequently emerged 
that the assailants had meticulously studied their target and likely received inside help. 
Managing the flow of information and being highly alert to the insider threat is imperative 
for the security of mines; how to do this effectively will be an issue addressed at the 
Forum in November. In addition to physical security threats, there has also been a rise in 
cyber threats targeting the industry.” (Mining Security Forum, 2014) 
In order to get a sense of the level of risk to mining in geographic resource-rich regions 
we refer to the world map published by Business Insider with respect to current state 
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Diagram 9 – Political Violence Index 2015 
 
Source: Business Insider, 2014 
Business Insider, 2014, reports that “Over the course of the next year, global stability is 
likely to continue to remain shaky as the world grapples with four major challenges: An 
increased threat from militant Islamism, aggressive Russian foreign policy, rampant 
global corruption, and elections in restive countries such as Myanmar and Nigeria”. 
(Business Insider, 2014) 
 
Ultimately, the issues for mining firm MNE’s is to proactively study and determine 
whether the political and security threat of prospective host-countries can be mitigated in 
such a way that ensures the safety of its workers, its establishment, its reputation and its 
financial stability.  Cost to secure perimeters, supply chain and mobility infrastructure can 
easily run out of control when security risks are not fully identified at the onset of a 
project, and most importantly, cost associated with human life that are both devastating 
and irreplaceable. 
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Risk #17: Geographical operating location, and relative threat to personal, civil 
and project safety  
 
Risk #18: Geographical operating location and degree of ability and cost to 
establish and/or maintain security infrastructure  
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Chapter 4: Methodology 
 
a. Risk Categories and Elements 
This paper primarily focuses on evaluating non-financial risks, the degree of due 
diligence and planning around these risks, and the possible financial implications of these 
risks for mining project viability.  Resource dependency theory is considered throughout 
the identification of risk elements, with reference to the relationship between 
environmental dependencies and uncertainties influencing firm strategy.  (Hillman, et al., 
2009)  
 
Risk categories are separated into financial and non-financial factors and a generally 
accepted list of financial risks are presented to further the reader’s understanding of how 
non-financial risk might be translated into financial impact to the project.   
 
A list of non-financial risk elements are devised through literature review, and absence of 
literature or research in areas thought to be critical to project success.  The focus on 
relevant literature regarding non-financial risk categories was framed using professional 
publications, primarily top ten risks provided by E&Y (2015) and Deloitte (2015). 
Literature review relied on both professional and academic forms of relevant research in 
an effort to take a holistic and evidence based approach to understanding risk from an 
operating perspective.  
 
   
49 
 
b. Risk Diagram 
We use the risk categories and elements identified through literature review to devise a 
risk diagram adopted from the socio-technical systems of organization development.  The 
socio-technical systems approach identifies three levels of organization work design that 
recognizes the relationship between people and technology in workplaces, or the 
interaction between environments and human behaviour. (Ropohl, 2014)  These three 
levels are demonstrated by the following general diagram: 
 





Source: Eastern State University, 2015 
 
For purposes of our paper, we adopt this theoretical approach regarding resource 
dependency and environmental influences to mining production, and related MNE risk 
factors in the following way: 
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Diagram 11 -  Mining MNE Levels of Risk Consideration 
 
 
In developing our risk diagram, previously identified risk elements will be categorized 
according to the above Community (Social License), National (Resource-Nationalism) 
and Global (Country Level) concerns. 
 
c. Case Study Selection 
Selection of cases for analysis will be largely arbitrary and subjective.  In order to control 
for validity, project similarities will be identified in terms of company structure 
(registered on the TSX or TSE, and publicly traded with equal reporting requirements 
under Canadian law).  Both projects will also be compared against country and 
geographic risk rankings as provided for by Transparency International's CPI, BPI and 
Business Insider’s Political Risk Index to determine relative levels of risk considerations 
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similar geographic risk profiles, in order to demonstrate a similar level of challenge with 
respect to entry, sustainability and profitability in these regions. 
 
Information collected for presentation of case studies will be entirely sourced through 
open sources, including company websites, news media and quarterly or annual reports 




Comparative case analysis will be presented in terms of similarities and dissimilarities 
between company and project approach with respect to investment and due diligence 
towards non-financial risk elements.  Analysis will take place referencing the Risk 
Diagram adopted above in respect of risk elements for country level, national level and 
community level concerns. 
 
e. Findings, Recommendations and Limitations 
Categorization of implications, where possible, will be presented in a table with 
corresponding colour codes of risk (red for high, yellow for medium, and green for low), 
and where possible, relevant financial information will be presented with respect to cost, 
quality and resource implications to the project regarding due diligence investment on 
individual risk elements. 
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Recommendations for future research and limitations of the research undertaken for this 
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Chapter 5: Risk Diagram for Non-Financial Risk Elements 
We present the following risk diagram and corresponding elements to guide our analysis 
of case study materials. 
 


















1. Degree to which host-country falls on the 
spectrum of public sector corruption 
2. Probability of corrupt practices in small 
business operations and local contracts 
3. Propensity of competitors to uphold ethical 
business practices in similar operating 
regions 
4. Geographical operating location, and 
relative threat to personal, civil and project 
safety  
5. Geographical operating location and 
degree of ability and cost to establish 
and/or maintain security infrastructure  
 
1. Degree of government quality, attitude and 
trust towards contract administration  
2. Government tax policy in respect of 
energy & resources 
3. Legislative framework surrounding 
ownership over supply chain and/or 
production efforts 
4. Perceived balance of government demand, 
investment in social programs, and 
reciprocal benefit to MNC project and 
long term operation 
5. Balancing investment for social 
development against reputation, ethics and 
governance considerations of the MNC, 
and resulting impact to capital funding 
 
1. Labor availability in the host community 
2. Degree of qualified skills associated with 
available labor in the host community 
3. Cost of investment to training balanced 
against production efficiency  
4. Perceived distributive and procedural 
fairness regarding equitable employment 
standards and pay 
5. General safety concerns regarding 
corporate/community conflict regarding 
labor relations 
6. Expatriate comprehension and readiness, 
and quality of pre-departure and ongoing 
cross cultural and language training  
7. National level comprehension and cross 
cultural training programs geared to 
enhancing reverse understanding of MNC 
driven individual and corporate culture 
along with social behaviours 
8. Degree of communications planning to 
enhance cross-cultural understanding the 
total workforce and surrounding 
community 
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Chapter 6: Case Study #1: Barrick Gold Corporation 
 
Organization:  Barrick Gold Corporation 
  Brookfield Place 
  TD Canada Trust Tower 
  161 Bay Street, Suite 3700 
  Toronto, ON M5J2S1 
  (Tel) 1.416.861.9911 
  (Web) www.barrick.com 
 
Project:  Pascua Lama 
 
Location:  Chile/Argentina, South America 
 
Company Profile: 
Barrick Gold Corporation (Barrick) is a Canadian (Toronto) based international gold 
mining company operating 14 mines and advanced exploration and development projects 
across 5 continents.  Country locations include Canada, the US, the Dominican Republic, 
Australia, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Chile, Argentina, Zambia, Saudi Arabia, and 
Tanzania.   (Marketline, 2014)  The below map, issued in the 2013 Annual Information 
Form, released on March 31, 2014, provides a visual representation of Barrick’s 
operations and projects globally: 
Diagram 13 - Barrick Gold Project Map 
 
Source: Barrick Gold, AIF, March 2014 
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In addition to the above noted projects and corporate holdings, Barrick also holds a 63.9% 
equity interest in Acacia Mining plc (“Acacia”), formerly African Barrick Gold, plc.  
Barrick promotes its vision to be “the world’s best gold mining company by operating in 
a safe, profitable and responsible manner” and articulates the following values: 
 Integrity 
 Respect and open communication 
 Responsibility and accountability 
 Teamwork 
 Creating shareholder value 
 
Source: Barrick Gold, Vision and Values, Retrieved 2015 
Barrick’s reports on its strategy to be anchored in the following five pillars: 
 An entrepreneurial structure; 
 Our balance sheet and financial flexibility; 
 Maximizing free cash flow; 
 A focus on our best assets and regions; and 
 Profitable growth in the Americas. 
  
Source: Barrick Gold, Annual Report, 2014, Retrieved 2015 
 
Barrick trades on the Toronto Stock Exchange (ABX:TSX) and the New York Stock 
Exchange (ABX:NYSE), as well as global stock index centers in London, the Swiss 
Stock Exchanges, and the Euronext-Paris. (Newenham-Kahindi, 2011).  It entered the 
global mining business in 1983 with 3 key areas of focus: 
 
 Consistent investment in exploration and development; 
 A district development approach, aimed at optimizing reserves on highly 
prospective gold belts; and, 
 Highly developed systems of disciplined acquisitions and mergers with other 
potential business companies (Newenham-Kahindi, 2011)  
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Barrick employs approximately 25,000 people globally, including approximately 250 at 
the head office in Toronto, Ontario, Canada.  The organization has undergone a 
significant amount of restructuring in recent years, shifting technologies support positions 
from the Toronto-based head office, to Nevada, USA, where it has a strong focus on 
prospective developments, leading to a number of resulting layoffs in Canada.  This 
included management restructuring and over 100 employee reductions at the head office.  
Additional reductions were undertaken stemming from project closures and/or stoppages 
due to the falling price of gold in recent years.  (Younglai, 2015)  Barrick reports on the 
reason behind its reorganization and rightsizing in its 2014 annual report, released on 
March 27, 2015 where they state that “we have cut our head office by close to half and 
eliminated all management layers between Toronto and the mines. What remains are 
shared service centers in the field that provide support directly to our mines and projects, 
with costs charged directly to the relevant operation.”  By all accounts, Barrick is 
committed to restoring its founding culture based on the ideology of “partners as owners”, 
while maximizing return on shareholder investment through disciplined focus on reducing 
capital expenditures.   
 
The annual report describes the company’s forward-looking strategy in the following 
areas: 
 
 Restoring a strong balance sheet through reduction of capital expenditures 
(targeted at $3 billion for 2015), through the sale of non-core assets, and 
maximizing joint-venture and strategic partnerships 
 
 Renewed focus on talent, and in particular, executive leadership 
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 Extension of their partnership model to include a new performance scorecard 
linked to executive compensation 
 
 Broader shift towards organizational partnership culture, including a stronger 
commitment to collaboration with host communities and governments that 
promote shared accountability and responsibility 
 
 Focus on growth prospects in Nevada, USA and the Andes, South America 
(primarily resuming production at Pascua-Lama after the project was suspended in 
2013) 
 
Source: Barrick Gold, Annual Report, 2014, Retrieved 2015 
 
Financial Performance: 
Barrick is reported to be carrying a US$13billion debt due to “cost overruns at a key 
project in the Andes” among other poor investment and acquisition decisions.  (Younglai, 
2015).  The 2014 annual report provides the following financial highlights that indicate a 
steady overall decline in revenue, decline in net earnings per share, decline in revenues, a 
significant drop in operating cash flow.  While this may in some part be attributed to the 
falling price of gold (price per ounce), Barrick’s capital expenditures widely increased 
due to considerable challenges associated with the Pascua Lama project in the Andes, 
including a multi-million dollar litigation process filed by the communities over water 
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Diagram 14 – Barrick Gold 2014 FY Financial Report  
 
Source: Barrick Gold, Annual Report, 2014, Retrieved 2015 
 
Despite the range of debt, Barrick attests to its financial advantage being strong liquidity 
(ending 2014 with $2.7billion of cash and equivalents, along with another $4billion 
available on its undrawn credit facility, coupled with a modest debt repayment schedule 
(less than $1billion due through 2017).   (Barrick Gold, Annual Report, 2015).  They 
provide a competitive financial cost comparison to other major mining firms in their 2015 
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Diagram 15 – Barrick Gold Cost Profile 
 
Source: Barrick Gold, Corporate Presentation, Retrieved 2015 
 
Barrick states its primary 2015 outlook on restoring a strong balance sheet and advancing 
attractive opportunities in Nevada. (Barrick Gold, 2015), promotes itself for its 
commitment to “disciplined, profitable production”, and highlights its investment 
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Diagram 16 – Barrick Gold Investment Proposition 
 
Source: Barrick Gold, Corporate Presentation, Retrieved 2015 
Risk Factors 
The following represents an incomplete list of Barrick’s risk factors, as identified in its 
2014 Annual Information Form.  Additional risks have also been listed, pertaining to 
specific company holdings or policies that have not been addressed below.  The risks 
listed represent some form of external or environmental influence to operations: 
 Metal price volatility 
 
 Foreign investment and operations, consisting of currency fluctuations, permitting 
delays and governmental restrictions, import/export restrictions and restrictions on 
the repatriation of earnings, as well as social issues, namely, infectious diseases 
 
 Environmental health and safety regulations, including costs of development, 
production, litigation and regulatory actions relating to environmental 
infringement 
 
 Permitting delays due to social and economic issues in the surrounding 
communities affecting the environment, and human health and safety 
 
 Replacement of depleted resources 
 
 Economic feasibility of projects 
   
61 
 
 Liquidity and level of indebtedness (limited by the need to use cashflow to repay 
principal and pay interest on the $13.1 billion debt) 
 




 Accuracy of estimated mineral reserves and resources 
 
 Price volatility 
 
 Mining risks and other insurance risks, including labour force disruptions and civil 
strife, weather conditions, equipment availability and environmental and industrial 
accidents 
 
 Production and cost estimates 
 
 Security and human rights, including criminal activities such as trespass, illegal 
mining, sabotage, theft and vandalism resulting in the suspension of operations 
 
 Community relations and license to operate, fuelled by opposing NGO’s, 
community dissonance and adverse publicity affecting company reputation and 
perceived effect of mining activities on surrounding communities 
 
 Government regulations and changes in legislation 
 
 Anti-bribery laws, prohibiting improper/facilitation payments 
 
 Interest rates 
 
 Acquisitions and integration 
 
 Employee relations 
 
 Availability of skilled labour 
Source: Barrick Gold, Annual Report, 2014 
 
Corporate Social Responsibility: 
Barrick issues its responsibility report, which depicts the company’s attitude and 
approach towards socially responsible business practices in the communities where it 
operates.  Here they advocate their “priority on developing long-term and mutually-
   
62 
 
beneficial relationships with host governments and communities, while working to 
minimize and mitigate the social and environmental impacts of our activities”. (Barrick 
Gold, Responsibility Report, retrieved 2015) The organization makes the following 
policies and management systems publicly available in their organization and governance 
breakdown: 
 
Diagram 17 – Barrick Gold Code of Business Conduct  
 
Source: Barrick Gold, Responsibility Report, Retrieved 2015 
 
Barrick has an external CSR advisory board, which provides an opportunity for the Board 
to interact with the senior leadership team to provide insight on emerging CSR trends and 
issues that could affect their business, as well as feedback on their corporate 
responsibility performance.  Collectively, the policies and processes, under continuous 
review, address all spectrums of non-financial risk, with a particular focus on corruption 
compliance, security threats, and social licensing considerations.  Barrick is a member of 
the United Nations Global Compact, a voluntary corporate responsibility initiative 
promoting strategic policy for businesses that are “committed to aligning their operations 
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and strategies with ten universally accepted principles, in the areas of human rights, 
labour, environment and anti-corruption.” (UN Global Compact, retrieved 2015) [Also 
see Appendix B: UN Global Compact, Ten Guiding Principles, and Appendix C: ICMM 
Ten Sustainable Development Principles] 
 
Barrick’s CSR advisory board issues the annual global reporting initiative on socially 
responsible practices and performance.  The most recent issue was released in 2013 and 
reported on combined requirements set forth through the UN Global Compact 
Communication and the International Council for Mining and Metals Sustainable 
Development Principles, with the following key highlights: 
 6th year listed on the Dow Jones Sustainable Development Index 
 One of the top 100 companies, as listed on NASDAQ Global Sustainability Index 
 Listed on the Corporate Knights Global 100 as one of the most sustainable 
corporations in the world 
 
 Presents the Suppliers Code of Ethics, extending human rights obligations to its 
supply chain 
 3rd party completion of human rights assessments at 8 of Barrick’s global sites 
 Adoption of TRACE International’s Trace Registered Access Code (TRAC), a 
technology enabled compliance tool geared towards anti-bribery standard setting 
 Advancement of the Community Relations Management (CMS) system, a set of 
programs to provide sites with systems, tools and training that addresses social 
risks and community engagement  
 
 Variety of international partnerships and alliances for the promotion of human 
rights and anti-corruption  
 
Source: Barrick Gold, 2013 Performance Update 
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The report also puts forward the below framework for analysis and reporting of material 
issues: 
Diagram 18 – Barrick Gold, Material Issues Framework 
 
Source: Barrick Gold, 2013 Performance Update 
Barrick appears to promote a comprehensive platform for the identification and 
mitigation of non-financial risks, with a heavy focus on community and stakeholder 
relations, and the global efforts to promoting anti-corruption, bribery and human rights 
initiatives. 
 
Examples of Barrick’s approach and response to systemic social issues in a host country 
are researched by Newenham-Kahindi, who provides an analysis of Barrick’s project 
operation in Tanzania.  The author evaluates the company’s response to social problems 
in dealing with the local challenges of poverty, unemployment, and environmental 
concerns when entering new markets in a developing country.  Generally speaking, he 
refers to new markets as “being characterized by complex institutional conditions, 
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corruption, weak legal and judicial systems, heterogeneous cultures, and a growing 
pressure for social stake-holding in local indigenous/communities”.  (Newenham-
Kahindi, 2011).  He reports on interviews conducted with Barrick executives regarding 
CSR initiatives and their commitment to CSR and community engagement, quoting that  
“responding to social and environmental issues in the communities where our business is 
based is no longer an option … we need a social framework that operates within the local 
communities … however, we have some challenges with strategic mechanisms (such as) 
how and with whom should we engage seriously in a committed manner in the 
communities and for how long?”  The executive interview goes on to report that “dealing 
with the social problems of poverty, environmental degradation and social injustices that 
face this area exceeds the scope of our company.  We need a responsible partnership with 
the government and local communities.”  The author reports on Barrick’s efforts to bridge 
social gaps by establishing a locally based mining institution for training local artisanal 
miners and students, but that these efforts were not fully accepted by community 
members due to poor corporate-community communication, and  lack of distributive 
fairness in compensation and government policy.  In his assessment, he concludes that “in 
spite of its efforts to address the social and ecological issues, Barrick continues to face a 
complex and ambiguous stakeholder problem from the host nation and from the local 
communities.”  He cites the company’s effort to “establishing partnerships with local 
stakeholders and then using those partnerships to tackle various social problems” but is 
faces challenges with translating global initiative into local context.  While Barrick was 
considered to be one of the more “responsive” global corporations in the mining industry 
to sustainable social welfare programs, its integrated business operations are governed 
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from its head office in Toronto, Canada, and displayed a disconnect with its host country 
office in Tanzania, also influenced by the Tanzanian government’s lack of strategy to 
dealing with social issues such as chronic sewage, crimes, poverty, unemployment and 
environmental problems. (Newenham-Kahindi, 2011). 
 
Marketline SWOT Analysis: 
Marketline provides the following SWOT analysis of Barrick, relying on information 
published at the company’s December 2013 year end: 
 
Table 5 - Marketline SWOT Analysis: Barrick Gold Corporation 
Strengths Weaknesses 
 Strong market position 
 Wide geographic presence 
 Huge impairment changes 
 Litigations and claims 
Opportunities Threats 
 Rising demand for gold 
 Divestiture of non-core assets 
 Strong competition 
 Risk from foreign investments and 
operations 
 
 Environmental laws and regulations 
  
Source: Marketline, 2014 
Marketline reports that the company’s global operations give it “competitive advantage” 
and also indicate that the company has a “wider scope in increasing its revenues by 
utilizing its global presence”, while “reducing exposure to economic conditions or 
political stability in any one country or region.” (Marketline, 2014)  Having said that, the 
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report also indicates huge impairment charges as a weakness, specifically citing “$5.2 
billion loss related to carrying value of property, plant and equipment at Pascua-Lama”.   
Total impairment charges for the organization’s global operations amounted to $12.6 
billion in FY2013, more than double FY2012.  Additional challenges or weaknesses 
include a rising number of litigation claims, such as with its project, Pueblo Viejo, 
operating in the Dominican Republic, where the community claimed gross human rights 
violations such as slavery, human trafficking and bribery of government officials.   
 
Marketline reports that Barrick is threatened by strong competition, and in particular, 
competition for the retention of senior executives and employees, facing loss of its 
employee base to its biggest sector competitors such as Kinross Gold Corporation, 
Newmont Mining, BHP Billiton (among others), which will impact Barrick’s market 
share.  Additionally, Marketline cites the risk posed from foreign investments and 
operations, which they summarize as risks “normally associated with any conduct of 
business in foreign countries”, including: political and economic environment, war, 




Having presented highlights of Barrick’s company profile, including geographic and 
financial position, as well as competitive position and corporate approach to addressing 
non-financial risk factors, we look to evaluate the company’s level of due diligence in the 
context of the Pascua-Lama project. 




Barrick acquired Pascua-Lama, one of the world’s largest open pit gold and silver mines 
with 15.4 million ounces of gold reserves and 674 million ounces of contained silver, and 
the first bi-national mining project in the world.  (Barrick Gold, Operations Report, 
retrieved 2015) Located on the border of Chile and Argentina in the Fronterra region, the 
project was expected to boost output at low operating costs. (Forbes.com, 2014) At its 
onset, Barrick promoted that “The Pascua-Lama project will generate enduring and 
substantial benefits for all concerned, through a combination of attractive economics, 
significant production at low cash costs, support by the governments of Chile and 
Argentina and robust environmental and community programs.” (Barrick FAQ’s) In its 
project FAQ fact sheet posted on the company website, Barrick provides the following 
information: 
 
 Pascua-Lama underwent a rigorous environmental impact assessment (EIA) in 
Chile and Argentina prior to its approval.  The EIA was approved in Chile in 
2006, after a 14 month review and associated costs of approximately $15 million.   
 The EIA in Argentina underwent 25 months of review, and involved extensive 
consultation with local communities, farmers and stakeholders, who were actively 
involved in the review process 
 Over 100 professionals of multi-disciplinary backgrounds, as well as 8 
international consulting firms, 2 Chilean and 2 Canadian universities were 
involved in the development of the EIA 
   
69 
 
 Significant concerns and mitigation strategies were put forward regarding water 
contamination and impacts to ice-fields and glaciers that led to an agreement for 
extensive  and participative technical and social monitoring by local communities 
 Barrick undertook more than 1000 meetings with local community leaders, 100 
presentations to community groups, participation in multiple public events and a 
door-to-door visit program that reached 40% of community homes, as well as 
issued 15,000 copies of an information newsletter to encourage communications 
and community engagement 
 
While Barrick intended to begin construction in 2004, unfortunately, Pascua-Lama ran 
into a considerable number of legal and regulatory issues that forced Barrick to suspend 
the project in the 4
th
 quarter of 2013.  In its 2013 annual report, Barrick recorded $5.1 
billion in impairment charges by Q2 2014, and expected cash outflows of $700 million in 
2014, with a further $170-190 million in cash outflows projected for 2015 for care and 
maintenance costs associated with the environmental regulations.  Total losses account 
for approximately $8.5 billion in sunk costs. (Smith, 2014).  Smith reports on an address 
by Barrick CEO Peter Munk following the suspension of Pascua-Lama, where he is 
quoted as saying “Today, the single most critical factor in growing a mining company is a 
social consensus – a license to mine.”  Barrick had halted the Chilean side of the project 
in the 2
nd
 quarter of 2013, following a court injunction filed by indigenous communities 
over environmental concerns pertaining to water contamination stemming from the 
project’s construction activities.  (Forbes.com, September 2014)  Despite Barrick’s efforts 
to providing health and education projects, housing construction for victims of the 2010 
   
70 
 
earthquake, and sponsorship of a 60$ million fund to the government for water 
improvements over the life of the mine, Barrick is thought to have made the mistake of 
believing that support by the government would also garner support by the local 
community.  (Smith, 2014).  While the Chilean court suspended the project in April 2013 
pending environmental assessment over claims brought about in the lawsuit, it later 
declared in March 2015 that no environmental damage to glaciers had occurred.  
(Canadian Mining Journal, March 2015) The Chilean lawyer leading the lawsuit argues 
that despite its strong commitment to Pascua-Lama, and “installing waste treatment 
infrastructure, long-haul roads, a cultural center, internet access, and creating scholarships 
for Valle de Huesco students, Barrick and [the project] are thought to be equated with 
crime, prostitution and migrant worker inflow, further stressing social licensing concerns.  
(Kirschke, 2014) A highlight of challenges facing the project, with consequent cost, 
schedule or quality overruns where available, are presented below: 
 
1. Environmental and Regulatory Permits - Barrick intended to begin construction in 
2004 however, challenges obtaining authority and permits from the host country 
governments, and host-country conflict between Chile and Argentina over taxation 
issues, delayed construction start times to 2009.  (Forbes.com, September 2015) 
 
2. Poverty - Communities with high rates of unemployment in Chile and Argentina who 
wholly rely on water-runoff from the Andes for their water supply, strongly opposed 
the mine and the government’s lack of concern for community welfare, filing an 
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injunction and law-suit regarding environmental damage to the water from project 
construction efforts.  (Smith, 2014) 
 
3. Litigation - A Chilean Court ordered the project to be suspended while environmental 
issues were being addressed in response to the law-suit, in April 2013.  (Smith, 2014) 
 
4. Litigation - Chile’s Tribunal Ambiental (Environmental Court) ruled on March 3, 
2014 regarding sanctions mposed on Barrick’s Pascua-Lama project over 
environmental violations… that up to 22 violations should have been considered 
individually and fines applied on an individual basis.  The tribunal annulled the 
original fine and ordered a re-evaluation of sanctions. (Anonymous., 2015)  
 
5. General Crime - Crime, prostitution and migrant worker inflow affiliated with Pascua-
Lama (Kirschke, 2014) In this sense, the project attitude or culture of workers can be 
seen to have negatively impacted or advanced negative social behaviours in the local 
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Chapter 7: Case Study #2: Go Gold Resources Inc. 
Organization:  GoGold Resources Inc. 
  Suite 1301, 2000 Barrington Street 
  Cogswell Tower 
  Halifax, NS B3J 3K1 
  (Tel) 902.482.1998 
  www.gogoldresources.com 
 
Project:  Parral Tailings Project 
 
Location:  Chihuaha, Mexico 
 
Company Profile 
GoGold Resources Inc. (GoGold) is a junior mining firm based out of Halifax, Nova 
Scotia, Canada. According to the company website, GoGold is a well-financed Canadian-
based silver and gold producer with properties in Mexico.  The company operates four 
projects, the Parral tailings project in Chihauhua, Mexico, the Santa Gertrudis project in 
Sonara, Mexico, the San Diego project in Durango, Mexico, and the Rambler project in 
Newfoundland, Canada.  In addition, the company holds rights to the Esmerelda Tailings 
Project, also in the Parral district of Chihuahua, Mexico, which is currently undergoing 
feasibility studies. GoGold's rights to the Esmerelda tailings project are defined by its 
proximity and association to the existing Parral tailings project currently being processed. 
As reported in the technical report and resource estimate released on April 2, 2015, The 
Esmeralda project is subject to monthly lease payments of $15,000 and net profit interest 
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Diagram 19 - GoGold Project Location Map 
 
Source: GoGold Resources Fact Sheet (2015) 
The president and CEO of GoGold is a professional geologist and along with his 
executive team, have raised hundreds of millions of dollars in capital markets to bring 
mines into production. (www.gogoldresources.com)  GoGold trades on the Toronto stock 
exchange (TSX:GGD) with stocks currently valued at CAD$1.50, and has approximately 
162,000,000 shares outstanding.  The company is classified as a junior miner, and was 
listed on the TSX Venture Exchange (TSXV) under the symbol GGD.P. in 
2010.  GoGold recently completed their acquisition of Aminas resources limited, (of 
which GoGold now owns and controls 100% of the issued and outstanding 
shares).  (Bloomberg Business, 2015)  In their December 2014 annual information form 
(AIF) filed on Sedar, GoGold identifies its subsidiaries to include Mexico Gold Holdings 
Corporation Inc., Absolute Gold Holdings Inc., both residing in Nova Scotia, Canada, and 
Animus Resources Limited, residing in British Columbia, Canada, and for all of which 
GoGold owns 100% ownership.  The AIF describes GoGold as a Canadian-based junior 
mining company engaged in the production, exploration, and development of mineral 
properties currently, holding three material properties in Mexico, with the remainder of 
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properties under exploration and development stages.  (Go Gold, AIF, 2014)  The 
corporation promotes its production strengths through the following strategies:  
 Low entry costs 
 Established land agreements in place for mining exploration,  
 Building of new plants on existing foundations,  
 Water already established  
 Existing camp administration facilities  
(Source: GoGold Resources, Corporate Presentation (2015) 
 
Financial Performance 
GoGold provides the below operating profile in their 2015 Corporate Presentation, which 
highlights “significant near term production growth with an attractive cost profile”.   
 
Diagram 20 - GoGold Operating Performance 
 
Source: GoGold Resources, Corporate Presentation (2015) 
 
The Company positions itself financially to be one of the lowest cost junior mining 
producers, which renders it attractive from an investment standpoint.  They present a cash 
cost profile in the 2015 Corporate Report which provides a highlight comparison of cash 
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costs among GoGold's junior competitors, demonstrating their competitive position 
regarding low cost production 
 
Diagram 21 – GoGold Cash Costs Comparisons 
 
(Source: GoGold Resources, Corporate Presentation (2015) 
Go Gold presents the total cumulative shareholder return on an investment of $100 of 
common shares against the total cumulative return of the S&P/TSX between 2010 and 
2014.  This demonstrates strong company performance and aligns with the organizations 
position as an attractive investment opportunity. 
 
Diagram 22 - TSX:GGD Shareholder Returns 
 
Source: Management Information Circular (Feb 2015) 
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According to recent reports by the company, and release of the Technical Report on the 
Esmerelda Tailings Project, GoGold is most strongly positioned to continue operating at a 
low production cost given their model of skimming from existing, historical tailings.  
This puts them at a financial advantage and strong competitive position at a time when 
commodity prices have been relatively unstable, and their competitors are struggling to 
control CAPEX budgeting and operational efficiencies. 
 
Risks 
Go gold speaks to risk management as a fundamental concern for the board of directors, 
which includes the review and approval of the corporations risk management and 
mitigation policies.  These policies are: 
 Review and assessing policies, controls and procedures  
 Ensuring the integrity and functioning of the corporation’s disclosure  
 Monitoring internal controls regarding management information system and risk 
management activities;  
 Review and assessing the corporations risk management policy and processes to 
identify, assess and mitigate strategic, operational and emerging risks to the 
corporation 
 Review strategic risks … and provide advice on the effective mitigation of those 
risks 
Source: GoGold Resources, Corporate Governance 
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GoGold identifies itself as a mineral exploration and developing-stage company with no 
track record of production.  Where it has only recently become a producing company, a 
number of related risks and uncertainties may occur. Risks are most specifically 
addressed in their Annual Information Form, filed on Sedar in December, 2014.  
Highlights of the financial risks are listed in the AIF, as follows: 
 Early-stage need for additional funds 
 Negative operative cash flow 
 Commodity price fluctuations 
 Credit counterparty risk related to funding received for and capital investments 
 Foreign currency risk.    
Economic dependence refers to GoGold’s dependence on the Orion’s Off-Take 
Agreement, whereby GoGold is contractually obligated to sell back output to the 
financier at a rate of 1.5 to 3% less than the price of gold and silver on the open market. 
(AIF, 2014) 
 
Additional nonfinancial risks are listed as: 
 Substantial environmental and reclamation costs  
 Community relations and license to operate  
 Political and country risk 
 Local groups and civil disobedience 
 Violence and theft in Mexico.   
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Each of these risks is provided a more detailed description.  In particular, GoGold 
identifies political and country risk for its potential factors, including royalty and tax 
increases or claims by governmental bodies, expropriation or nationalization, foreign 
exchange controls, import and export regulations, cancellation or renegotiation of 
contracts and environmental and permit regulations. GoGold states that it currently does 
not have any political risk insurance coverage against political and country risk. (GoGold, 
AIF, 2014)   
 
Additionally, they discuss in the AIF the role of the Mexican Ejido, a local group that 
presides over the communal ownership of land, which is recognized by federal laws in 
Mexico.  The Ejido controls accessibility rights to communal property, and GoGold 
recognizes that their existing agreements with the Ejido's have an impact on all of their 
properties in Mexico, and that some of these agreements may be subject to renegotiation 
which provides a risk of uncertainty to future operating viability.  Finally, considerable 
increase in violence and theft associated with drug cartels in various Mexican regions, 
and surrounding areas where GoGold projects and properties are located are identified for 
their possible effect on financial performance of the company.  Other mentioned risks 
include: 
 
Skills availability - Due to its required specialist skills and knowledge in areas including 
geology and drilling, GoGold refers to possible difficulty competing for qualified 
resources due to the widespread availability of project choices globally, combined with a 
shrinking skilled labour force. 




Procurement and supply chain - In particular GoGold reports that increased mineral 
exploration activity has caused difficulty with procurement of goods and services, 
including raw materials which may result in delays or increased costs in connection with 
undertaking exploration and development. 
 
Environmental regulations are listed as a risk, where the company is subject to 
environmental regulations including environmental baseline studies and assessments 
which could delay operations. While GoGold received necessary environmental impact 
approvals in order to proceed with the Parral project, environmental precautions are 
required during construction and operation which include a requirement for reclamation 
and rehabilitation of the project when processing is complete. (AIF, 2015) 
 
Corporate Social Responsibility 
While GoGold does not currently have a published position or policy on corporate social 
responsibility, the company publishes its code of business conduct and ethics.  The code 
of conduct "embodies the commitment of GoGold and its subsidiaries to conduct business 
in accordance with all applicable laws, rules and regulations and high ethical 
standards”.  The code speaks to compliance with the following: 
 Laws, rules, and regulations 
 Conflicts of interest 
 Employment and outside employment  
 Outside directorships, business interests and related party transactions 
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 Confidentiality, non-disclosure and whistleblowing policies 
 Corporate opportunities  
 
Additionally, CSR perspectives may be found in the company's position with respect to 
subsection 7 and 8 of its code of conduct and ethics, which refers to gifts, favors 
entertainment and payments received and/or given by employees.  (Sedar.com:GoGold 
Resources)  In particular, section 8 states that “gifts, favors, and entertainment may be 
provided only if the following conditions are met: 
i. They are consistent with accepted business practices, are of sufficiently limited 
value  
ii. They are in a form that could not be construed as a bribe or payoff  
iii. They are not in violation of applicable laws and generally accepted ethical 
standards for public disclosure  
iv. The facts will not embarrass Go Gold. (Source: www.sedar.com/CheckCode.do) 
 
It is interesting to note that GoGold does not display any reports pertaining to a position 
on corporate social responsibility, or strategies or activities related to social licensing, 
community engagement or government relations in any news media, company filing or 
other publicly available report.  
Parral Tailings Project 
 
Our review of GoGold will center on the exploration and development of their launch 
project, The Parral Tailings gold and silver project located in Chihuahua, Mexico.  The 
project landscape covers 141 hectares north of the city of Parral, and operates on the 
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model of skimming dry land tailings deposited from historical mine sites formerly 
operating between the 1600's to 1990.  GoGold acquired the project through the 
acquisition of Absolute Gold Holdings in 2012, and the pre-feasibility study was 
completed in 2013.  The project site is located in the city of Parral, easily accessible on 
well-maintained highways from the city of Chihuahua, and in order to secure agreements 
from the city of Parral to mine, GoGold entered into an agreement to issue a rental 
payment of US$30,000 per month for the land. (GoGold, AIF, 2014) 
 
As reported in the 2014 AIF, GoGold poured its first silver bar from the Parral project on 
June 3, 2014, announcing that it had substantially completed construction of the process 
plant at a capital expenditure cost of approximately US$32.5 million (ahead of the 
budgeted cost of us $35 million).  Additional reports on initial operating costs show 
mining and processing cost average of US$6.50 to $US8.50 per tonne of ore,  which is 
much lower than reported in the pre-feasibility study (that predicted a cost of 
approximately US$12 per ton of ore in the first year of production). (GoGold AIF, 2014) 
 
In order to fund the project GoGold entered into a credit agreement for financing with 
Orion MF investment holding company 2 (Cayman) limited, where Orion provided 
US$30million in secured debt, which binds  GoGold to sell all of the refined gold and 
refined silver produced from the Parral project up to 250,000 ounces of refined gold, and 
15 million ounces of refined silver, at an estimated 1.5 to 3% reduction from the sale 
price of gold and silver on the open market (Go Gold, AIF, 2014)  According to the 
technical information on the Parral project, as of September 30, 2014, approximately 
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108,000 ounces of silver and  174 ounces of gold have been produced.  (Go Gold, AIF, 
2014). 
 
GoGold presents the following position on the commissioning and production at the 
Parral Tailings Project in their 2015 corporate presentation: 
 
Diagram 23 - GoGold Parral Project Production Report 
 
Source: GoGold Resources, Corporate Presentation (2015) 
 
The pre-feasibility study was completed by MDM Engineering Limited, and the 280-page 
report was released on SEDAR on March 4, 2013.  The report provides a review of the 
following social and economic concerns surrounding the project geography, location and 




 The project is located in the city of Hidalgo del Parral, in the Mexican state of 
Chihuahua, with municipality total population of 103,519 people. Location is 220 km 
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from state capital.  The area of the project location is entirely owned by the municipality 
and does not include any private ownership.  The town purchased all rights to the tailings 
material, along with the land, from the private mining company Grupo Mexico S.A.B., 
who retains mineral rights to mine and deposit. (Dodd., et al., 2013)  GoGold would have 
been required to consider their strategy towards approaching negotiations with town 
officials regarding leasing and developing the land under the town’s ownership, and in 
particular, may have been concerned about culture of transparency and commitment to 
negotiated contracts that could financially impact the capital expenditure budget. 
 
 4.2 Permitting 
 GoGold was required to obtain a series of licenses and permitting before they were able 
to perform any construction or operating activities on the tailing site.  Related non-
financial risks include opportunity for delay, government intervention, and town 
resistance to the issuance of permits, most specifically with respect to authorization on 
environmental impact and risk, authorization for change land-use, concession for 
domestic water use and permit of wastewater discharge, environmental licensing and 
registration as a generator of hazardous waste.  Additional program requirements included 
prevention of accidents, import licensing of hazardous substances and land-use 
permitting. (Dodd, et al., 2013) 
 
 5.1 Accessibility, Climate, Local Resources, Infrastructure And Physiography 
As was identified in the nonfinancial risk framework, precautions need to be put in place 
in order to protect against risks to supply chain movement. site accessibility, and climate 
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affecting access to the site and quality of materials in storage, as well as the availability of 
local resources, including but not limited to physical supplies, property, plant and 
equipment, and human resources and skilled labor.  These essential factors require in-
depth consideration and risk mitigation plans to deter cost, quality, and scheduling 
impediments to the project.  The prefeasibility report issues that the tailings project site 
can be accessed on a well-maintained, paved highway from the city of Chihuahua, on 
national roads, with an estimated travel time of 2.5 hours. (Dodd., et al., 2013)   Concerns 
with respect to increasing violence caused by drug cartels in various areas of Mexico 
would require mitigation strategies to be put in place surrounding security and supply 
chain movement during periods of ground transportation.  The feasibility study reports on 
the location of the international airport with daily flights to the United States and Mexico 
City in close proximity to the town of Parral, with an airstrip in Parral that can 
accommodate small aircraft.  Research and publicly available data provides no indication 
of whether GoGold has elected ground transportation for the 2.5 hour domestic travel 
from the capital city, or rather, flight options enabled by private aircraft to land closer to 
the site location.  Cost implications would need to be evaluated in order to understand the 
greater impact between re-routing flights for personnel through US international airports 
directly into Parral, versus flying into the city of Mexico and driving to the site, and then 
weighed against probability of security risk for travel.  
 
 Resources include commercial businesses and restaurants, as well as skilled personnel, 
equipment, suppliers and contractors. The feasibility report provides that the town of 
Parral is historically a mining town, and therefore provides an ample supply of skilled 
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personnel equipment, suppliers, and contractors that would be sufficient to support the 
project.  In addition, infrastructure is already in place to support generation of electrical 
power and water, which is both supplied through the town grid. (Dodd, et al.  2013)  
Ample availability of resources significantly reduces the risk of the company from having 
to import and train personnel, or inflate capital expenditures for infrastructure to 
guarantee self-sufficiency.    In addition, the decision of GoGold to undertake the project 
on a ready-made tailings pond with existing infrastructure, has allowed them to ramp up 
speed to production while saving on heavy constructions costs. 
 
 17.8 Risk and Impact Assessment 
 The feasibility report identifies that GoGold had not established formal mining safety 
controls at the time the feasibility report was being conducted.  As a result they relied on 
the South African Mine Health And Safety Act (29) of 1996 as a reference for health and 
safety standards.  (Dodd et al., 2013)  Health and safety risks are classified under 
subheadings: Chemical Stress, Physiological Stress, Physical Stress, including lighting 
and vision, and Heat and Cold Extremes, Vibration, Ventilation, and Radiation, along 
with biological stress and ergonomic stress regarding hazardous tasks. (Dodd, et al., 
2013)  There is no research or open-source information that indicates the degree of 
precautions that GoGold undertook to prevent or mitigate health and safety risks.  
Presumably, a considerable amount of strategic design would be required to mitigate 
these risks, especially in light of the potential for differences in operating health and 
safety standards, attitudes, or regulations between Mexican local subcontractors, and that 
of the Canadian Federal and Nova Socita provincial occupational health and safety codes.   




The feasibility report was based on the assumption that the project implementation would 
take the form of the main contractor supervising local subcontractors and local labor 
wherever possible through design and construction of the tailings plant.  The report 
stipulates that the mine infrastructure construction would be entirely carried out by local 
or Mexican sub-contractors. (Dodd et al., 2013)  As such, GoGold would face 
procurement risk along with permitting risk and refinement of cost estimate, and would 
need to pay particular attention to local Latin American and Mexican culture for their 
aspects of transparency in negotiating commercial contracts or contracts for services.  
Available data sources, academic research, and open source information fails to provide 
any insight into whether GoGold was presented with any considerable amount of 
challenge with respect to negotiating contracts, and GoGold also fails to provide 
information as to their approach in contract negotiations with local authorities. 
 
 20.  Environmental Studies, Permitting and Social or Community Impact 
 Arguably, this section is most critical to the research interest on non-financial risk, and 
negotiating or securing stakeholder engagement regarding GoGold's obtainment of a 
social license to operate.  The feasibility study reported "impact on local town, the 
payment of taxes to the government, and the potential population increase."  Most notable 
impacts were seen to be in respect of air quality affecting the local surrounding areas of 
the project due to emissions and dust, as well as changes to use of the soil in the 
overexploitation of natural resources that have resulted in modification of the structure 
and composition of vegetation.  Additional concerns were included with respect to 
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endangered species of snakes and vipers that would be displaced by mining activities.  
(Dodd et al., 2013).  Due to the hazardous characteristics of the project, rock acid 
drainage, and release of metals in a site close to the population of the city of Parral, 
significant attention should have been paid to relocation and process of the tailings, 
environmental mitigation strategies, and reclamation strategies prior to project 
implementation. (Dodd et al., 2013) 
 
Positive socioeconomic impacts are identified as the generation of necessary 
employment, improvement of economy of business, and strengthening the economy of 
the municipality and state through taxation.   Negative socioeconomic impacts are 
identified as incremental population of the city of Parral, not necessarily sufficient to 
support development activities of the project, along with economic distribution and 
population increase resulting in increases in the price of goods and services, and loss of 
employment opportunities and economic distribution following project closure.  (Dodd, et 
al., 2013).   
 
While the pre-feasibility study identifies high-level issues and concerns that would 
require consideration prior to project construction and implementation, a more detailed 
review of specific strategies, and corresponding costs or resource requirements impacting 
schedule, quality and/or cost of the project would be helpful in determining more 
specifically what risks were most prevalent or most widely impacting the mode of entry 
into the town of Parral. 
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Chapter 8: Comparative Analysis, Discussion and Practical Implications  
Following our presentation of the two projects case studies, Barrick Gold’s Pascua Lama, 
and GoGold Resources’ Parral Tailings Project, this research study aims to provide a 
highlight of risks and challenges, with a specific interest to identifying overlapping risk 
factors, along with differences in corporate/company or project methodology and 
approach for mitigating these risks.  Financial impacts have been identified where 
information was available pertaining to the costs associated with devising mitigation 
strategies, or where project quality or scheduling deficiencies are known to have 
occurred.   
 
The below Comparative table presents a summary of non-financial risk factors, (taken 
from Chapter 5: Non-Financial Risk Framework), with corresponding project specific 
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Table 6 - Comparative Non-Financial Risk Issues and Impacts 
 
*Note – Full Sized Table attached as Appendix A 
Discussion 
We provide our assessment on a matrix of similarities and dissimilarities, where risk 
factors represent all risks identified in the risk framework presented in chapter 5, and in 
accordance with the socio-technical approach to evaluating risks at a micro, meso and 
macro level. 
 
 On an assessment of similarities and dissimilarities, we draw the assumption that micro 
is community level risk with the most direct, day to day interaction with the project. 
These risks tend to take the form of any impact to the local community and surrounding 
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environments where the communities live, relocation requirements, opportunities and 
risks associated with availability of skilled labor, as well as cultural interactions and 
related corporate and community communication efforts.  Meso level is considered to be 
mid-level, national which we identify with as nationalism, or resource nationalism, 
largely driven by political and government interactions with the corporation.  Most of 
these issues tend to revolve around government attitudes towards procurement and 
contract administration, tax policy, and legislative framework guiding the mining 
operations.  Considerations with respect to social impact management or social programs 
is given to the extent that some governments mandate investment by corporations into 
government selected social programs, which do not necessarily provide a realized benefit 
to the operating project.  Reputational risk represents the degree to which the corporation 
or the project can suffer from risk associated with government interactions that would 
have impact on project viability and associated cash flows or investment attractiveness.    
Finally we look to macro level geopolitical risks in the context of global geography and 
global security risk. Company concerns associated with macro level risks include the 
degree and likelihood to which the corporation will find it needing to engage in unethical 
negotiation practices with public-sector representatives or small businesses, and the 
degree to which those decisions are influenced by competitor’s ethical practices, as well 
as personal and project safety requiring heavy security infrastructure based on the level of 
global terrorism or civil terrorist, violent or criminal threat deemed to be present in the 
host country. 
 
   
91 
 
 Our visual analysis presents checkmarks in all risk categories where each company has 
experienced some form of challenge associated with those identified risks.  This allows 
for a simple determination of overlap and quick understanding of the most prevalent risks 
facing the organization.  Columns identified as undetermined represent a lack of research 
availability or lack of available information on issues specific to those risks, or company 
approaches to risk mitigation. 
 
An initial review demonstrates that Barrick Gold was challenged by many more non-
financial risks and cost impediments than was seemingly experienced by GoGold 
resources at the Parral tailings project.  In particular, Barrick was afflicted by a high 
degree of government and legislative intervention that restricted their permitting issuance 
and delayed project start up over the course of 20 years.  As Barrick was heavily invested 
into the project, they were not in a position to offset limitations posed by the government 
and spent a considerable amount of time trying to come to an agreement with both 
national level legislative frameworks, and local indigenous communities that government 
had empowered to intervene in the progress through the international labor organization 
in Chile.  The ILO mandated the inclusion of indigenous people in strategy and labor 
contract negotiations regarding major capital projects. (Nolen, 2014) 
 
 Additional issues with respect to Barrick included heavy amounts of investment into 
social programs where the company guaranteed a $60 million investment into 
benefication for housing, earthquake relief, education and healthcare over the period they 
were aiming to operate.  Unfortunately they did not experience a good return on their 
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investment of those social programs, as the project never received full approval to go 
forward with commissioning and development.  It is interesting to note that they never 
did receive social license to operate, and that the biggest concern causing delays, 
frustration and finally cancellation of the project, was in respect of community dissonance 
towards mining in the glacier region, because mining activity was perceived to have 
negative impacts to water quality.  While this issue overlaps with environmental concern, 
one can also make the argument that Barrick's failed to effectively engage with the local 
communities, and convey their message and their intention with respect to water quality, 
usage and potential contamination provides the basis for our assertion that local 
communities, and a social license to operate (more so than the government in this case) 
had the greater impact to project viability.  As a result of a series of litigation claims 
brought against Barrick by local indigenous communities regarding their livelihoods, and 
geographic residential area, it was forced to cease project activities in the fourth quarter 
of 2013. Consequently, Barrick reported $8 billion in write-offs and lost 20 years of 
negotiating time, while ultimately not realizing the anticipated reciprocal benefit of the 
labor contribution from the local population for which they were helping to develop skills 
and economic standing. 
 
 By comparison we can see that GoGold seems to have had much greater success with 
moving their Parral tailings project into production. GoGold did experience many of the 
same conflicts or challenges that Barrick faced, however it appears their corporate 
strategy for project development was undertaken on a much different platform and met 
with a greater level of success and receptiveness by both government and local 
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communities.  While Barrick chose to invest in the first ever cross-border project 
spanning geographic boundaries from Chile to Argentina, and costing billions of dollars 
in infrastructure development, training programs, and government and community 
negotiations, GoGold, by comparison, elected to develop a ready-made facility in a 
geographic region with a long history of mining activity, fully available resources, and 
supportive township and community.  GoGold was able to secure their social license 
through their agreement with the Ejido's  to obtain accessibility rights to land, and 
through their commitment to payment of $30,000 montly in lease fees along with 12% net 
profit interest.  This seems to have been a successful strategy for GoGold to secure a 
partnership with the local township to both support and protect the site, while engaging 
the local township in the majority of labor contracts associated with project development.  
This partnership with community stakeholders and governmental officials has also 
allowed GoGold to pursue new development opportunities and feasibility studies with 
respect to projects in surrounding areas of similar size and scope to the current Parral 
Tailings.  These collective benefits enabled GoGold to take their projects from feasibility 
to production on schedule and ahead of budgeted cost. 
 
 The GoGold business strategy with respect to Parral Tailings contrasts with Barrick 
Gold’s aspirations at Pascua Lama.  Barrick undertook a project in a community with 
completely unskilled and undeveloped indigenous peoples, who did not demonstrate 
understanding or receptiveness to the project from its inception, and who did not possess 
the skills associated with and required for mining activity.  As a result, Pascua Lama 
required considerable amounts of investment of time and money associated with 
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additional communications platforms, training programs, and stakeholder engagement 
practices. 
 
 We draw the conclusion that GoGold may face sizeable risks to personal, civil and 
project safety, and most-likely incurred significant costs associated with required security 
infrastructure. While there was no specific strategy or cost impact discovered through our 
research specific to GoGold strategy and expenditures on the issue of safety, general 
geographic research reveals an increasing level of violence in Mexico associated with 
drug cartels, especially towards foreign operators, workers and travelers, as is seen by the 
recent murders of four employees from a Canadian-based mining company in Mexico.  
This would allow us to draw the conclusion that GoGold would have considerable costs 
associated with respect to security infrastructure that appears to be more pressing then 
what Barrick experienced in Chile and Argentina (a geographic region that generally 
speaking, is more open to the mining sector, and more stable with respect to political and 
intra-country violence). 
 
 We reviewed the rank of Chile and Mexico on the Corruption Perception Index put 
forward in Table 2.1 by Transparency International, where Chile ranks 21 and Mexico 
ranks 103 on a scale of 1 (least) to 174 (most) corrupt countries to do business.  In our 
analysis we note GoGold, as a junior miner, does not possess the stringent reporting 
parameters, policies, procedures, or corporate ideology that Barrick appears to have 
extensively developed and made publicly available for all operating activities, from the 
range of CSR to foreign corruption standards. As a result of limited information, there is 
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no way to verify whether or not GoGold, in the course of its business in Mexico, at any 
time engaged in public or private  sector negotiations that would not have matched the 
ethical standard of some of their larger competitors. 
 
To conclude discussion of our analysis, while we recognize that both companies have 
attempted to establish projects in complex geographic regions that are afflicted by 
poverty, and to some degree, levels of foreign corrupt practices,  or at the very least, 
strong government intervention in foreign investment,  we draw the conclusion that 
nonfinancial risk is underrepresented in research, and yet presents highly probable 
impacts to capital expenditures  and production efficiency, with cost, quality, and 
schedule restrictions.  As in the case with Barrick, non-financial risks have proven to pose 
considerable implications for reputation and investment attractiveness of mining 
organizations.   
 
Our research demonstrates practical implications for management seeking to operate in 
remote and arduous geographic regions, where political and social stability is wavering, 
such that organizations may appear to underrepresent reporting of costs and resource 
efforts associated with nonfinancial risk.  While reporting metrics for listing on the TSX 
and NYSE requires stringent financial issuance over corporate performance, 
organizations must give consideration to the financial implications of nonfinancial risk 
line items in their budget sheets.    Furthermore, it is probable to draw causation between 
non-financial and financial risks, such that non-financial risks directly influence creeping 
capital expenditures, along with reputation that in turn influences investment 
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attractiveness and stock valuation.  It would be a useful learning exercise for 
organization’s to share best practices with respect to forward-looking mitigation strategies 
for those non-financial risks that have proven to cause project delays beyond a point 
where the investment can be recovered.  It may be worth organization's considering the 
potential that nonfinancial risk, and in particular nationalism and social license concerns, 
would largely impact the investment opportunity and investment decisions over large 
capital expenditure projects. Based on the operating platform of GoGold and its perceived 
success, we consider the possibility that smaller scope projects with lesser complexity 
may present higher earning potential in terms of net present value, due to their likelihood 
to be brought to production on time, within budget, and to some degree of quality 
standard. 
 
 Finally, risk factors were devised using an evaluation of combined academic and 
professional resources, and risk categories were identified through combined professional 
resource publications. These reports on business risks facing mining and metals, and 
trends for mining and metals provide globally acceptable definitions of non-financial risk 
factors representing industry-wide understanding and with little variation between 
definitions among major competitor firms and/ or industry stakeholders.  These 
nonfinancial risks apply not only to mining, but to the broader space of energy and 
resources, including oil and gas and renewable power, and can be commonly applied to 
any international organization seeking to do business in emerging market.  As such, the 
results of this study, and any future studies pertaining to cost impacts and strategies 
associated with non-financial risk would greatly benefit global organizations in their 
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assessment of entry barriers into emerging markets.    Where resource rich countries also 
tend to be primarily characterized as emerging markets, energy and resource sector 
corporations must continuously seek new and creative ways to balance corporate, 
cultural, community, and political conflicts between developed and emerging market 
stakeholders.    Results of this research, and any future research, provides a new 
mechanism of mutual understanding, not only for corporations, but for officials in 
emerging markets to evaluate their negotiating platforms, and attitudes towards 
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Chapter 9: Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
 
 The research presented in this report is subject to a number of limitations. First, no 
primary data was collected in the course of this research initiative. It would be useful for 
future research studies to consider specific issues of nonfinancial risk, and conduct a 
qualitative study to validate the data in the context of projects or geographic regions of 
interest.    Qualitative data could then be used as the basis for performing quantitative 
analysis on the cost-benefit impact and return on investment with respect to more 
thorough implications of nonfinancial risk to operating viability. 
 
Secondly, the conclusions and analysis are drawn based on information that was obtained 
through widely available open source, academic research, and company reports as well as 
news media reports and publicly filed documents. There appears to be an absence of 
information on line item issues pertaining to nonfinancial risks that were identified in our 
framework. Those risks were primarily devised through academic, peer-reviewed papers, 
and while we sought to verify the costs associated with those nonfinancial risks through 
an analysis of two operating projects this research was challenged by lack of availability 
of specific information pertaining to identified non-financial risks.  Additionally, open 
source information is subject to varying degrees of transparency by the issuing 
organization, and/or bias or abstract contextual frameworks as issued through media 
reporting.  Consideration must be given to the degree of accuracy of information 
published and available through open source, where validation is made difficult due to a 
lack of verification through the collection of primary data. 




 Thirdly, researcher knowledge, experience, and understanding of the energy and 
resources sector, and in particular, challenges associated with the mining project lifecycle 
influenced decisions with respect to research categories, risk categories, and nonfinancial 
risk factors.  Projects that were the subject for comparative analysis were selected largely 
based on the arbitrary interest of the researcher, with some controls put in place for 
comparative geography and home-country operating standards. 
 
 Finally, the two projects selected for comparative analysis were not of the same size and 
scope, and were wholly owned and operated by corporations of considerably different 
expertise in the mining sector.    Future research may address the possibility that 
outcomes would differ if comparative analysis was conducted on two organizations 
operating projects of similar size and scope. 
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Chapter 10: Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
To conclude our research, we revisit our initial research questions and provide insight and 
recommendations.  
1. To what degree does non-financial risk impact financial operating ability in 
mining related capital expenditure projects. 
 
Based on our analysis of Barrick’s Pascua Lama Project located on the border of Chile 
and Argentina, we have been able to demonstrate a direct correlation between non-
financial risk factors and operating viability.  Our visual analysis provides a 
representation of most frequent risks, and overlapping risks that are non-financial in 
nature and that require a significant amount of pre-acquisition feasibility, beyond high 
level identification.  In particular, it would appear that micro-level risks posed by the 
host-country’s most affected surrounding communities in fact hold a considerable degree 
of power over the social license to operate, and have a direct bearing on project viability 
and associated capital expenditures.  It would be of great benefit for mining organizations 
to openly share their experiences, including challenges, successes, costs and benefits 
associated with obtaining social license, and to provide this information in much more 
detail than is currently reported by professional standards.   This would help to educate all 
stakeholders, not only to community related challenges, but associated costs and 
probability of project success. 
 
2. What elements of non-financial risk planning should be undertaken in the early 
stages of a project that would improve the probability of successful outcomes? 
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Based on our analysis, we uncovered that social license concerns and related risks have a 
considerable amount of influence over project success.  While efforts are undertaken 
during pre-feasibility and feasibility studies to determine high-level concerns pertaining 
to community, environment and social impact management, we suggest that it would be 
useful for organizations to undertake this review at a much more detailed level at a stage 
prior to project acquisition.  Organizations would also want to consider investigating 
history of the country cultural attitude towards mining, with a view to determining how 
community culture impacts resource nationalism.  This was demonstrated at Pascua Lama 
when the community incited the Chilean Supreme Court to shut down the project while 
the community claim remained under investigation.  Mining organizations must not 
assume that because they have national level buy-in that the community concern would 
not take priority with government policy enactment.  
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Appendix B: UN Global Compact, Ten Guiding Principles 
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Appendix C: ICMM Ten Sustainable Development Principles 
 
The 10 principles 
01. Implement and maintain ethical business practices and sound systems of corporate 
governance.  
02. Integrate sustainable development considerations within the corporate decision-
making process.  
03. Uphold fundamental human rights and respect cultures, customs and values in 
dealings with employees and others who are affected by our activities.  
04. Implement risk management strategies based on valid data and sound science.  
05. Seek continual improvement of our health and safety performance.  
06. Seek continual improvement of our environmental performance.  
07. Contribute to conservation of biodiversity and integrated approaches to land use 
planning.  
08. Facilitate and encourage responsible product design, use, re-use, recycling and 
disposal of our products.  
09. Contribute to the social, economic and institutional development of the communities 
in which we operate.  
10. Implement effective and transparent engagement, communication and independently 
verified reporting arrangements with our stakeholders.  
(Source: ICMM 10 Principles) 
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